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INTRODUCTION
In the 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger2 cases, the Supreme Court
addressed the use of race in the admissions policies of institutions of higher education,
holding that the pursuit of diversity was a compelling interest which would justify the
consideration of race. The Supreme Court also freed institutions to pursue a "critical
mass" of minority students through narrowly tailored policies in which race was only
one of several factors to consider when admitting students. 3 The Supreme Court did
not, however, address the use of race in any context outside of admissions, creating
uncertainty as to how broadly the Court's pronouncements could be applied. This
Article seeks to resolve some of the uncertainty by exploring the constitutionality of
"minority-targeted aid" policies-financial-aid policies that direct institutions to
consider race when making award determinations or that limit aid eligibility to students
from particular races and ethnicities.
Based on the Supreme Court's assertion that diversity is a compelling interest which
yields educational benefits, many scholars believe that race-conscious recruitment,
outreach, financial aid, and support programs may all be justified if they are narrowly
tailored.4 Although scholars and practitioners alike are unsure as to how exactly the
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Professor William Clune, at the University of Wisconsin, for the many hours he patiently spent
guiding this project as my advisor. I am also grateful to Professor Roberto Corrada, Professor
Gil Carrasco, and Professor Michael Olivas for detailed and thoughtful feedback on the analysis
in the article. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Kamal James, who has never failed to
support me in all my endeavors, professional or personal.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-30.
4. See THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., REAFFIRMING DIVERSrrY: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE UNIvERsrTY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACION CASES, A JOINT STATEMENT OF
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court would analyze minority-targeted aid, most apply the 2003 holdings
directly to minority-targeted aid programs as if the goals, benefits, and burdens of
financial aid and admissions programs are exactly the same.5 Under such an analysis,
minority-targeted aid can only be awarded in a process that uses race as one factor for
consideration when selecting award recipients, and race-exclusive aid, which restricts
the group of students eligible for the aid, is unconstitutional.
There is, however, little precedent to support this legal analysis of minority-targeted
aid. Only two lower court cases have addressed minority-targeted aid, and as discussed
in Part I.A., neither case addressed the use of minority-targeted aid in the pursuit of
diversity. 6 Moreover, although the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) issued a 1994 memo endorsing both race-conscious and race-exclusive aid,
OCR has since taken a seemingly more hostile stance on the issue.7 In the absence of
clear guidance from the courts, organizations opposed to the use of race-conscious
policies in higher education have worked together to challenge the use of minority-
targeted aid programs on college campuses.8 The result has been widespread retreat by
institutions of higher education from minority-targeted aid. Indeed, minority-targeted
aid has been described as being in a "state of flux and confusion."
9
This Article argues that both race-conscious and race-exclusive aid are
constitutional. Part I explores the current status of minority-targeted aid, presenting
both the current legal status of minority-targeted aid, highlighting the uncertainty
among institutions of higher education regarding use of the aid and the resulting retreat
by institutions from the aid in response to litigation threats. Part II conceptualizes
minority-targeted aid as an enrollment-management tool and considers how strict-
CONSTTUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS 2 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
policy/legal-docs/Diversity_%20Reaffirmed.pdf.
5. See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (applying the standard of analysis articulated in Grutter and Gratz
to draw legal distinctions between admissions and financial aid); Elizabeth B. Guerard, The
Lingering Question of Race, U. Bus., June 2005, available at
http://www.universitybusiness.com/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=388 (referring to interview with
education law attorney during which attorney applies questions posed by the Court in the
Michigan cases to minority-targeted financial-aid analysis).
6. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1994) (striking down a
University of Maryland scholarship program reserved for African-American students because
the University failed to show that its own segregated and discriminatory past justified the
scholarships); Flanagan v. Georgetown Coll., 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976) (striking
down a Georgetown University Law Center scholarship program, which reserved sixty percent
of funds for minority students who only constituted eleven percent of the student body, because
the Law Center failed to demonstrate that minority students had disproportionate need for the
funds).
7. In 2004, OCR issued a statement declaring that "[g]enerally, programs that use race or
national origin as sole eligibility criteria are extremely difficult to defend." Peter Schmidt, Not
Just for Minority Students Anymore, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 19, 2004, at
A17.
8. For example, Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal Opportunity reports that in response
to a campaign of letters threatening to file complaints with OCR regarding that institution's
minority-targeted aid program, seventy colleges opened up the programs in question to
nonminority students. Id.
9. JAMES A. BECKMAN, AFFIRMATIvE ACTIoN Now: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS, FAMIJES, AND
COUNSELORS 109 (2006).
[Vol. 85:851
DOG WAGS TAIL
scrutiny analysis of minority-targeted aid is changed in that context, ultimately
concluding that both race-conscious and race-exclusive aid programs are
constitutional.
Minority-targeted financial aid has long been incorrectly conceptualized as a
competitive process independent from admissions. In order to reap the benefits of a
diverse student body, however, the pursuit of a critical mass of minority students must
be a multistep effort. Step one is admission of minority students through an admissions
process guided by the analytical framework established in Grutter and Gratz. The
second step focuses on actually enrolling a critical mass of minority students, a goal
that is often unattainable without financial aid. Accordingly, minority-targeted aid is
correctly conceptualized as an enrollment-management tool used to give effect to
admissions decisions. Like the admissions process sanctioned in Grutter, race-
conscious aid is viable because it provides each potential aid recipient with an
individualized review process in which race is only one factor to consider. Race-
exclusive aid is also viable because although race or ethnicity limits eligibility, the aid
is motivated by the legitimate pursuit of a critical mass of minority students. Moreover,
individualized review is still required, and there is no undue burden on nonminority
candidates as long as the amount of aid does not exceed what is necessary for
enrollment management aimed at a critical mass.
I. MINORITY-TARGETED AID'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE
During the 2003-2004 school year, over $122 billion of financial aid in the form of
federal, state, institutional, and private sources was made available to students.10 As the
costs of higher education continue to sharply rise, scholars, critics, students, and their
families have all paid increased attention to the use of financial aid, including minority-
targeted aid, to not only meet student financial need, but to also influence student
enrollment. This use of financial aid has been reflected in a shift in emphasis by
institutions of higher education from need-based aid to merit-based aid.
As merit aid reemerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it expanded to
include minority-targeted financial aid.1 One of the first merit-aid programs
implemented by Oberlin College, for example, was a scholarship for minority students
that awarded high-achieving black and Latino students a $4000 grant.12 Similarly, a
1994 survey of liberal arts colleges found that all of the colleges surveyed reserved
some of their merit scholarships for outstanding minority students and that even those
institutions that did not give merit awards often offered minority students preferential
aid packages consisting of more aid in the form of grants and less aid in the form of
loans.' 3 Even though minority-targeted aid can be considered affirmative action, it is
still at its core a financial-aid program, and historical trends in financial-aid practices,
including increased reliance on loans over grants, greater emphasis on merit relative to
10. ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHANGES IN PATTERNS OF
PRICES AND FINANCIAL AID, at iii (2005).
11. ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA GOLDBERG, CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
AND FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994, at 151-55 (1998).
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 157-58.
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need, and higher tuition coast, have all affected the impact of minority-targeted aid in
higher education.
Today, minority-targeted aid is distributed in two forms. The first form uses race as
a "plus factor" or as one of many factors considered in selecting award recipients; for
purposes of this Article, such aid will be referred to as race-conscious aid. The second
form uses race to limit aid eligibility to applicants from a minority racial or ethnic
group; such aid will be referred to as race-exclusive aid.
14
Whether race-conscious or race-exclusive, minority-targeted aid is generally
administered according to one of four models. In the first model, the institution
develops criteria for aid eligibility, processes applications, provides funding for the
awards, and selects the recipients. 15 In the second model, funding for the aid is
obtained from both the institution and outside or private sources. 16 In the third model,
funding for the aid is obtained exclusively through an outside or private source. 17 The
fourth model completely eliminates the institution through the use of a private entity
that provides the funding, selects recipients, and operates at "arm's length" from the
institution.'
8
Institutions that award race-conscious or race-exclusive aid according to the first
three models are subject to federal scrutiny regarding their use of race in selecting
award recipients; it is less clear whether aid awarded according to the fourth model is
similarly subject.' 9 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial
14. In higher-education parlance, the term "race-conscious aid" is generally used to refer
both to aid that considers race as only one factor among many in selecting recipients and to aid
that limits eligibility by race or ethnicity. The meanings assigned to the terms "race-conscious"
and "race-exclusive" in this Article are used for the sake of clarity and are applicable to this
Article only.
15. Gus Douvanis, Is There a Future for Race-Based Scholarships?, C. BoARD REv., Fall
1998, at 18, 22.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Debate exists about whether higher education constitutes a "contract for educational
services" subject to scrutiny under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in
the making of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). The provision is applicable to both public
and private contracts and is applicable to contracts for educational services. Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 168, 172-73 (1976); see also BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 113. The Supreme Court
itself has recognized the applicability of § 1981 to private contracts and contracts for
educational services, writing in Gratz v. Bollinger that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "proscribe[s]
discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." 539
U.S. 244, 275-76 n.23 (2003) (citing MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
295-96 (1976)). The Court also said that "a contract for educational services is a 'contract' for
purposes of § 198 L."Id. (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172). Similarly, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the
Court explained that "the prohibition against discrimination in § 1981 is co-extensive with the
Equal Protection Clause," and that because the law school's admissions policy satisfied strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, it also satisfied § 1981. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
Critics argue, therefore, that private scholarships awarded for education are "contracts" within
the meaning of § 1981 and that even scholarships like those awarded by the United Negro
College Fund (UNCF) might be subject to legal challenge once applied to a student's tuition at
an institution.
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discrimination at any institution that receives federal funds, including federal financial-
aid funding and research grants. Moreover, in response to a Supreme Court decision
holding that Title VI's prohibitions on discrimination applied only to the particular
programs or departments within institutions that were receiving federal financial aid,
20
Congress passed legislation in 1988 stating that federal financial aid received by any
program within an institution obligated the entire institution to comply with Title VI.2'
Almost all institutions of higher education, public and private, receive federal funding
in some form and are thus subject to Title VI's prohibition on discrimination. Title VI
is a particularly strong section of the Civil Rights Act because it derives its power from
the Spending Clause of the Constitution, which authorizes federal agencies to withhold
funding from institutions that violate the Constitution. In addition, it creates a private
cause of action for individuals to sue for violations of the Act.22 Finally, the Supreme
Court has concluded that Title VI's definition of discrimination is coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 As such, institutions of higher education that administer
minority-targeted aid are vulnerable to potent legal challenges that will ultimately be
decided under the Court's Fourteenth Amendment strict-scrutiny rubric.
It is difficult to predict, however, how the Court's strict-scrutiny rubric will be
applied to minority-targeted aid. To compound the uncertainty, existing court
precedents and pronouncements from OCR have failed to provide consistent and
dependable guidance as to how minority-targeted aid should be analyzed.
A. Judicial Precedents
Case law addressing minority-targeted aid is scarce. In 1976, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia decided Flanagan v. Georgetown College,24
a case that predates both the decision in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke25 and any Department of Education guidelines on minority-targeted aid. In order
to increase minority enrollment, the Georgetown University Law Center reserved sixty
percent of its scholarship funds for minority students, who made up only eleven percent
of the student body.26 A white student whose scholarship was funded exclusively by the
unreserved funds, even though the funds reserved for minorities had not yet been
exhausted, filed suit.27 The court first noted that because there was no evidence of past
discrimination by the Law Center, the financial-aid policy constituted affirmative
action as defined in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
20. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 605 (1984).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (2006).
22. Douvanis, supra note 15.
23. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 n. 1 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("In
Bakke five Members of the Court were of the view that the prohibitions of Title VI-which
outlaws racial discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance-
are coextensive with the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 (1978).
24. 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
26. Flanagan, 417 F. Supp. at 379-80.
27. Id.
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regulations at the time.28 These regulations applied Title VI to institutions funded by
HEW and defined affirmative action as policies or programs enacted to "overcome the
effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular
race, color, or national origin.
' 29
The court then decided that Title VI's prohibition against discrimination must be
balanced against federal regulations that provide for affirmative action.30 Accordingly,
the ultimate question was whether the Law Center needed to allocate sixty percent of
its funds to eleven percent of its students merely because they constituted a minority.
31
In response to that question, the court determined that when a process like admissions
is permeated with social and cultural factors, separate treatment for minorities may be
justified in order to ensure that all candidates are judged in a racially neutral fashion.32
Financial need, however, "cuts across racial, cultural, and social lines," providing no
justification for the conclusion that minority students with demonstrated financial need
require more aid than nonminority students with the same amount of demonstrated
33
need. The disproportionate distribution of a sparse resource like financial aid to one
group to the detriment of another group was a violation of Title VI.
34
The next federal circuit court decision on minority-targeted aid would be decided
eighteen years later, after the Court's decision in Bakke but before the decisions in
Grutter and Gratz. In 1994, Daniel Podberesky filed suit against the University of
Maryland at College Park (UMCP) because he was denied a Banneker Scholarship. 35
Although Mr. Podberesky was academically qualified, the scholarships were only
awarded to African-American students.36 Mr. Podberesky was Hispanic and therefore
ineligible. 37 The race-exclusive Banneker Scholarships had been established as part of
UMCP's desegregation plan to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 Funded
from both state and private funds, the provision of fimancial aid on a race-exclusive
basis had been approved by OCR.39
In response to the Fourth Circuit's insistence that the aid program be narrowly
tailored to respond to the compelling interest of remedying the present effects of past
discrimination, UMCP issued a report recommending the continuation of the Banneker
Scholarships based on the present effects of UMCP's history of segregation and
discriminatory acts against African-Americans. 40 Present effects of that history
included the university's poor reputation in the black community, the
underrepresentation of African-American students at the university, the high attrition
28. Id. at 384.
29. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (1975)).
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 384.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Podberesky v. Kirwan (Podberesky fl), 38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1994).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Podberesky v. Kirwan (Podberesky 1), 956 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1992).
39. Id.
40. Anne Wells & John L. Strope, Jr., The Podberesky Case and Race-Based Financial
Aid, J. STUDENT FIN. AIm, Winter 1996, at 33, 35-38.
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rates of enrolled African-American students, and the hostile climate for African-
Americans on campus.4'
The Fourth Circuit, however, was unconvinced that the university's segregated and
discriminatory past justified the existence of the Banneker Scholarships.42 In striking
down the program, the Fourth Circuit cited concerns regarding inaccurate statistics on
the underrepresentation and high attrition rates of African-Americans. 43 The court also
considered the hostile environment on campus to be a result of societal discrimination,
rather than the university's segregated past.44 Moreover, the scholarship program was
not narrowly tailored both because it was unclear how efforts to attract high-achieving
Blacks already on their way to college would increase retention rates and because the
university failed to demonstrate that it had considered race-neutral solutions to the
retention problem.45 Although the university appealed the case, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 46 The decision not only prohibited race-exclusive scholarships at the
University of Maryland, but it also served as a barrier to race-exclusive aid at all
institutions within the Fourth Circuit, including other institutions in Maryland, as well
as those in Virginia, West Virginia, and Delaware.
The Podberesky decision laid the groundwork for future challenges to minority-
targeted aid within the Fourth Circuit. In 1996, a complaint filed with OCR alleged that
Northern Virginia Community College's use of minority-targeted scholarships was in
violation of the law as established in Podberesky.47 A private foundation created by
college officials funded the scholarships, but the foundation was located on campus
and aid recipients were chosen by the college.48 Although federal agencies typically
decline to enforce circuit court decisions unless it is clear that an institution has
misinterpreted a Supreme Court decision, the OCR ultimately concluded that the
scholarship program was a violation of the Podberesky ruling;49 the college could not
prove that they were remedying past discrimination because the college had never
discriminated against minority students.50 If race-exclusive aid was to be made
available to students through private sources, the college could not be involved with
administration of the aid in any way. By enforcing the Fourth Circuit's Podberesky
41. Id.
42. Podberesky I, 38 F.3d at 147.
43. Id. at 156-57.
44. Id. at 154-55.
45. Id. at 158-61.
46. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
47. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 109.
48. See Douvanis, supra note 15, at 22-23; see also Patrick Healy, Education Department
Sends Strong Warning on Race-Exclusive Scholarships, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuC. (Wash.,
D.C.), Oct. 31, 1997, at A47.
49. Healy, supra note 48. The OCR also considered the scholarship program to be a
violation of the Department of Education's own policy on minority-targeted aid to cultivate
diversity. Id. Data given to the OCR revealed that by 1994, retention rates for minority students
equaled or exceeded those of white students at the college. Id. Accordingly, race-exclusive aid
was unnecessary. Id. For a detailed discussion of the Department's own policy on minority-
targeted aid, see infra Part I.B.
50. Healy, supra note 48.
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decision, OCR implicitly endorsed the ruling, suggesting that the decision should be
national policy.5'
The D.C. District Court's ruling in Flanagan, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in
Podberesky, and OCR's subsequent enforcement ofthe Podberesky ruling have raised
concerns among institutions of higher education regarding the legality of minority-
targeted aid, and race-exclusive aid in particular. The legal significance of the cases,
however, is unclear. Although the Flanagan case essentially prohibited all racially
exclusive financial-aid programs,52 the holding is limited to the District of Columbia.
Similarly, although endorsed by OCR as potential national policy, the Podberesky
holding is limited to the Fourth Circuit. Moreover, Flanagan and Podberesky are
remedial cases that focused on an institution's compelling interest in remedying past
discrimination.
Both Flanagan and Podberesky were also decided before the Supreme Court
decided Grutter and Gratz. The Grutter and Gratz decisions marked a shift away from
the use of race as a remedial tool to the use of race as a tool to cultivate diverse student
bodies. In the Grutter case, the Court affirmed Justice Powell's diversity rationale as
explained in Bakke, establishing that diversity is a legitimate compelling interest that
will justify the use of race in the admissions process as long as race is one of several
competitive "plus" factors considered.53 The Court's holding in Gratz also affirmed
diversity as a legitimate compelling interest for institutions of higher education,
although it struck down the admissions policy at issue for insufficient narrow
tailoring. 54 Collectively, the two cases conclusively established that diversity is a
compelling interest that justifies the use of race-conscious college programs.
Unfortunately, the cases failed to address minority-targeted aid specifically. Neither
case overturned the Flanagan and Podberesky holdings, both of which were based on
efforts to remedy past discrimination. Nor do the Grutter and Gratz cases alter the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the race-exclusive scholarship program at issue was
insufficiently narrowly tailored. As such, the chilling effect of the existing court
precedents regarding minority-targeted aid, and of the Podberesky holding in
particular,55 did not abate with the Grutter and Gratz decisions. Thus, minority-
targeted financial aid remains in a "state of flux and confusion.,
56
B. Guidance from the Office for Civil Rights
The Department of Education has only once formally issued guidance on the legal
status of minority-targeted aid-in 1994, OCR issued a notice in the Federal
Register.57 Never revoked by OCR, and considered by practitioners to be the "bible"
5 8
51. Id.
52. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 107.
53. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325-30 (2003).
54. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-72 (2003).
55. BECKMAN, supra note 9.
56. Id.
57. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994).
58. Daren Bakst, Race-Targeted Financial Aid: Untangling the Legal Web, STuDENT Am
TRAIscRiPT, Winter 2000, at 4, 4.
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on the legality of minority-targeted financial aid, the notice clarifies how colleges,
including historically black colleges and universities, 9 may use financial aid to
promote diversity and minority access to institutions of higher education without
violating federal antidiscrimination laws. The notice applies to student financial aid
that is awarded, "at least in part, on the basis of race or national origin";60 as such, the
notice applies to both race-conscious and race-exclusive aid. In drafting the notice,
OCR consulted a then-recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
concluding that those scholarships restricted to students of a specific race or ethnicity
constituted a very small percentage of scholarships awarded to all students.
61
The notice outlines five principles that represent the circumstances under which
62
minority-targeted aid is legally permissible, according to OCR's legal interpretations.
Under Principle 1, financial aid may be distributed to disadvantaged students, without
regard to race or national origin, even if the awards disproportionately go to minority
students.63 Disadvantaged students include students from low-income families, students
from single-parent families, and students from school districts with high dropout
rates. 64 These awards are permissible, despite their potentially racially disproportionate
effect, because the indicia of disadvantage have a demonstrable relationship to the
institution's educational mission; an applicant's character, motivation, and ability to
overcome an educational disadvantage are educationally justified considerations in
both admissions and financial-aid decisions.
65
Principle 2 permits an institution to award financial aid "on the basis of race or
national origin if the aid is awarded under a federal statute that authorizes" its
distribution. 66 The fact that there are such federal statutes, however, does not itself
authorize states or institutions to create their own minority-targeted aid for a reason
other than those outlined in the notice.
67
Principle 3 allows an institution to award financial aid on the basis of race or
national origin if it is necessary to overcome the effects of the institution's "own past
59. The notice addresses the unique status of historically black colleges and universities
(HBCUs), particularly in light of Congressional findings regarding their "special role and needs
... in light of the history of discrimination by States and the Federal Government against both
the institutions and their students." Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 8758. Accordingly, the Department interprets Title VI to permit these institutions to
participate in student-aid programs established by third parties that target financial aid to black
students across the country, even if the HBCUs must contribute their own institutional funds to
participate in the program. Id. According to the Department, "[p]reclu[sion] ... would have an
unintended negative effect on [HBCUs'] ability to recruit talented student bodies and would
undermine congressional actions aimed at enhancing these institutions." Id. Otherwise, HBCUs
may neither create their own race-conscious aid programs using institutional funds, nor accept
privately donated funds restricted to use for race-conscious aid at HBCUs, unless the program
satisfies the five general principles outlined in the notice. Id.
60. Id. at 8756.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8757.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 8759.
66. Id. at 8757.
67. Id. at 8759.
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discrimination." 68 In such cases, a court or administrative agency should make a
finding of discrimination. 69 A state or local legislative body may also make a similar
finding if the legislative body has a strong basis in evidence identifying the
discrimination within its jurisdiction for which remedial action is necessary.7 ° In
addition, an institution may award minority-targeted financial aid to remedy its own
past discrimination without a formal finding, but it must be ready to demonstrate in
court that there was a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the institution's
discrimination necessitated awarding minority-targeted aid.71 Documentation of
specific intent to discriminate is not necessary, and statistical evidence from which one
can infer intentional discrimination against minority applicants may suffice.72
Principle 4 permits minority-targeted aid if an institution uses the aid to promote its
First Amendment interest in cultivating diversity through recruitment and retention.
73
In this context, an institution may consider race or national origin as a "plus factor,"
along with other factors, if the aid is necessary to further the institution's interest in
diversity and is narrowly tailored.74 The Department presumes that the use of race as a
plus factor is narrowly tailored as long as the institution periodically reexamines the
necessity of its use of race.
75
Principle 4 also permits an institution to use race or national origin as a condition of
eligibility if the aid program is necessary to further an interest in diversity and does not
unduly restrict access to financial aid for those students who do not meet the race-
based eligibility criteria (i.e., the program is narrowly tailored).76 OCR will determine,
on a case-by-case basis, whether such programs are narrowly tailored based on the
following factors: (1) whether a race-neutral means of achieving the goal would have
been ineffective; (2) whether a less intrusive use of race would have been ineffective;
(3) whether the use of race is limited in extent and duration and is applied in a flexible
manner; (4) whether the institution regularly reexamines the continued use of the racial
classification; and (5) whether the racial restriction unduly burdens students who
cannot be beneficiaries of the aid.77
Finally, Principle 5 permits a recipient of federal financial assistance to distribute
aid funded by private gifts restricted by race or national origin only if the aid is either
distributed to remedy the effects of past discrimination pursuant to Principle 3 or
distributed to achieve a diverse student body pursuant to Principle 4. T Privately
68. Id. at 8757 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 8760. For example, evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the
percentage of minority students in an institution's student body and the percentage of qualified
minorities in the relevant applicant pool might be sufficient. Id.
73. Id. at 8757.
74. Id.
75. Id. at8761 n.10.
76. Id. at 8757.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 8757-58. To be sure, financial aid awarded on the basis of race or national
original may be provided by an organization that does not receive federal financial assistance, as
Title VI does not apply to such organizations. Id.
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donated funds that are not restricted by race or national origin can be used to fund aid
that is distributed pursuant to Principle 1.79
To date, the notice guidelines remain the only complete and comprehensive guide
regarding the permissibility of using race or ethnicity as a basis for awarding financial
aid. In response to the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Podberesky, the
Department of Education's Office of the General Counsel issued a memo to college
and university counsel across the country, reaffirming the Department's policy on
minority-targeted aid as outlined in the 1994 notice.80 The memo also clarified the
holding in Podberesky, explaining that the Fourth Circuit did not rule that all race-
targeted scholarships were impermissible but only that the university failed to prove
that their scholarship program was narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of
past discrimination.8 ' As such, the Podberesky decision did not invalidate Principle 4
of the notice, and institutions could still consider race when distributing financial-aid
awards to cultivate diversity.
82
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas,8 3 struck down a race-conscious
admissions program, writing that Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke was not
a legitimate compelling interest because Justice Powell did not speak for a majority of
the Court. In response, the Office of the General Counsel issued a second memo
reaffirming its position that minority-targeted aid was permissible in "appropriate
circumstances" and stating that neither the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwoodnor the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case affected the Department's position.8
4
The memo also elaborated on the Court's denial of certiorari, explaining that the denial
neither affirmed nor reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and that the Court had not
necessarily departed from Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke.8 5 Finally, the
Department expressed its belief that outside of the Fifth Circuit, it was permissible for
an institution to "consider race in a narrowly tailored manner in... its financial aid
program in order to achieve a diverse student body or to remedy the effects of past
discrimination in education systems."
8 6
79. Id. at 8758.
80. Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Coll. and
Univ. Counsel (Sept. 7, 1995), available at http://www.acenet.edu/bookstore/descriptions/
making thecase /legal/ED 95 09.cfm (Memorandum on Race-Targeted Student Financial
Aid).
81. Id. at 1-2.
82. Id. at 2.
83. 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th Cir. 1996). A subsequent interpretation by the Attorney General
of Texas stated that the Hopwood decision applied not only to admissions but to financial aid as
well. The Attorney General of Texas, John Comyn, eventually reversed the interpretation,
noting that the pronouncement was too broad and should be limited solely to admissions. Bakst,
supra note 58, at 7. The Gratz and Grutter holdings, however, have succeeded in overturning
the ruling in Hopwood, establishing conclusively that diversity is a compelling interest that
justifies the use of race-conscious college programs. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
84. Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Coll. and
Univ. Counsel (July 30, 1996), available at http://acenet.edu/bookstore/descriptions/
makingthe case/legal /ED 96 07.cfn (Memorandum on Impact of the Hopwood Decision).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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As discussed above, however, OCR would go on to endorse Podberesky through its
investigation of Northern Virginia Community College. 7 In addition to a finding that
the college's scholarship program violated the Podberesky ruling, OCR also concluded
that the program violated the Department's guidelines on minority-targeted aid.88
Because retention rates for minority students at the college equaled or exceeded those
of white students, race-exclusive aid was unnecessary under Principle 4.89
C. Recent History
Based on the rulings in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, it seems certain that cultivating
diversity is a compelling interest that justifies the use of race-conscious programs at
institutions of higher education. Nevertheless, with only a dated OCR policy for
guidance, and court precedents that are not necessarily applicable to aid distributed in
the pursuit of diversity, institutions are still unsure about the viability of minority-
targeted aid programs.
Moreover, the applicability of the Grutter and Gratz decisions to minority-targeted
aid is subject to debate. Roger Clegg, Director of the Center for Equal Opportunity
(CEO), has expressed his belief that the prohibition of discrimination outlined in the
companion cases must "extend to scholarships, internships, summer programs, and the
rest."90 In contrast, Elisie Boddie of the NAACP has noted that the companion cases
applied only to the use of race-conscious admissions programs, and they do not
mandate that racially exclusive scholarships be opened to nonminority students.
91
Recent events indicate that the debate still rages, and the uncertainty has caused
colleges and universities to retreat from minority-targeted aid.
1. Investigations of Minority-Targeted Aid by the Federal Government
OCR has never revisited or updated its 1994 guidelines. Nor has any court
overturned, invalidated, or even addressed the guidelines. Moreover, scholars note that
the guidelines would probably withstand a legal challenge because they are based on
Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke, which was subsequently affirmed in Gratz and
Grutter.92 Accordingly, it should be the best indication of the Department's official
position regarding minority-targeted aid. Nevertheless, despite the Department's
assertions in 1995 and 1996 that it has no desire to revisit the 1994 guidelines, the
Department has begun numerous investigations into minority-targeted financial-aid
programs at institutions around the country, suggesting a more hostile stance in recent
years toward minority-targeted aid, particularly race-exclusive aid.93 Furthermore,
87. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
88. Healy, supra note 48.
89. Id.
90. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. Although Boddie does not discourage institutions from reexamining their programs,
she "[doesn't] think it's wise for them to so quickly abandon ship" because "these programs are
critical, and without them, diversity on campus can very easily unravel." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
92. Id. at 110.
93. Schmidt, supra note 7.
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OCR issued a statement in 2004 declaring that "[g]enerally, programs that use race or
national origin as sole eligibility criteria are extremely difficult to defend."
94
The investigations are often prompted by organizations like CEO, the American
Civil Rights Institution (ACR), and the National Association of Scholars (NAS), and
the Center for Individual Rights (CIR), all of which work in tandem to find and
challenge programs that only serve members of certain racial and ethnic minorities.
95
Their targets include minority scholarships, fellowships, internships, and summer
sessions for minority students.96 Roger Clegg of CEO, for example, has admitted to his
organization's campaign to "'visit the web site of every college and university in the
country' to look for evidence of race-exclusive programs." 97 Organizations like CEO
use freedom-of-information laws to force colleges to disclose how much weight is
given to race in admissions and financial-aid programs. 98 The organizations then send
letters that accuse the institutions of violating civil-rights laws, demand that the
institutions open minority-targeted programs to all students, and provide a deadline by
which the institutions must comply. 99 If the institutions do not comply, the
organizations file complaints with OCR.100 CEO and ACR are reported to have used
this method to jointly contact approximately 100 colleges, mostly between 2003 and
2004.101 Roger Clegg reports that about seventy colleges responded by either opening
up the programs in question or by informing his organization that the programs had
already been opened.1
0 2
In an effort to avoid costly litigation, institutions often capitulate to threats by
organizations like CEO and ACR or ultimately settle with OCR.1 0 3 In 1997, OCR
investigated race-exclusive scholarship programs at Florida Atlantic University,
including the Martin Luther King, Jr. Scholarships that the university used to increase
minority enrollment.'1 4 The investigation was a follow-up to a complaint originally
filed by the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) in 1990.105 In a letter responding to
the WLF's complaint, OCR stated that it believed the MLK scholarship programs to be
"legally supportable as narrowly tailored measures to pursue the university's interest[]
94. Id.
95. Peter Schmidt, Behind the Fight Over Race-Conscious Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 4, 2003, at A22 [hereinafter Schmidt, Behind the Fight]; Peter
Schmidt, Excluding Some Races from Programs? Expect a Letter from a Lawyer, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 7, 2003, at A22 [hereinafter Schmidt, Excluding Some
Races].
96. Id.
97. Peter Schmidt, From 'Minority' to 'Diversity,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.),
Feb. 3, 2006, at A24.
98. Schmidt, Behind the Fight, supra note 95.
99. Schmidt, Excluding Some Races, supra note 95.
100. Id.; see also Peter Schmidt, Federal Civil-Rights Officials Investigate Race-Conscious
Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 17, 2004, at A26.
101. See Schmidt, supra note 7.
102. Id.
103. Cf id.
104. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 111.
105. Letter from Barbra Shannon, Acting Director, Atlanta Office, Southern Division, Office
for Civil Rights, to John C. Scully, Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation (Apr. 3, 1997) (on
file with author).
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in seeking a diverse student body."' 1 6 Moreover, OCR noted that the university's
continued use of race, even as a limit on eligibility, was supported by sufficient
evidence of the institution's previously unsuccessful attempts at achieving diversity.'0 7
Despite its findings, however, OCR "advised the university that using race as a plus
factor, rather than an eligibility criterion, could... strengthen the legal support for
[the] programs."' 1 8 Acting on this "advice," the university opened the MLK
scholarship program to all applicants, utilizing race only as a plus factor and promising
to give "equal, if not greater, weight to economic need and scholastic achievement."' 0 9
The university also removed race restrictions on three additional race-exclusive
scholarships, including the Southeastern Consortium for Minorities in Engineering
Scholarship (SECME), the Minority Education Achievement Award (MEAA), and the
South African Scholarship." 1
0
In 2004, the OCR responded to complaints regarding the Minority Pre-College
Scholarship Program in Wisconsin."' The program was established in 1985, and
provided money for black, Hispanic, American Indian, and Asian-American students in
the sixth through twelfth grades to attend precollege programs at colleges throughout
the state. 1 2 The program cost the state approximately $1.1 million per year and
distributed scholarships to 4000 minority students." 3 In the fall of 2001, a private
citizen filed a discrimination complaint with OCR." 4 As a result of the investigation,
OCR negotiated a settlement with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction
(DPI) to open the scholarship program to nonminority students.' 15 Officials of the state
agency explained, however, that they decided to make the changes only after
concluding that OCR would not allow the program to remain race-exclusive."l 6 The
settlement called for the program to be renamed as the "DPI Pre-College Scholarship
Program" and stripped the program of any eligibility criteria linked to race or
ethnicity.117 Rather, scholarships would be awarded to needy students.'" The
settlement did stipulate, however, that DPI was free to take account of race if the
program failed to help enough minority students under the newly established income-
based criteria."19
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 111.
110. The SECME was revised to include race as only one factor to be considered, the MEAA
was changed to provide financial aid to all disadvantaged students, and the South African
Scholarship was opened to all South African citizens, regardless of race. Letter from Barbara
Shannon, supra note 105.
111. Peter Schmidt, Education Department Pressures Wisconsin to Open Scholarship
Program to White Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 3,2004 (on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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In 2005, OCR began investigating a complaint filed by a retired economics
professor from the University of Wisconsin who alleged the university system was
violating federal civil-rights laws by providing financial aid specifically to minority
undergraduates. 20 The Ben R. Lawton Minority Undergraduate Grant Program,
established under a state law enacted in 1985, limits eligibility to students who are
black, Hispanic, or American Indian, or whose families came to the United States as
refugees from Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam. 12 In 2004, the program provided awards
of up to $3000, averaging about $1400 each, to 2715 students. 122 In contrast to other
institutions that quietly opened their race-exclusive aid programs to all students in
response to investigations, the University of Wisconsin vowed to defend its race- and
ethnicity-based scholarships, noting that the program was "forward-thinking . . .
progressive" and "in the best interests of the students in [the] state.' 23 As of the 2007-
2008 school year, OCR was still investigating the university's scholarship program.1
24
In November 2005, even the Department of Justice stepped into the fray. In
response to a complaint filed by CEO, the Justice Department wrote a letter to
Southern Illinois University, notifying the institution that it would file a suit against the
university system's board of trustees and administration for using three graduate
fellowship scholarships to engage in a pattern of intentional discrimination against
Whites, nonpreferred minorities, and males. 25 Initially, Southern Illinois challenged
the Justice Department, explaining that the programs had a combined budget of only
$200,000 out of a total $12 million in aid given to over 4000 graduate students per
year.126 To focus on the lack of white men in the graduate fellowship program "without
at least 'noting the myriad of options available to all graduate assistants would simply
be unconscionable."" 27 By January 2006, however, the university had reached an
agreement with the Department in which the fellowships would be opened to any race
or gender.'
28
2. Widespread Retreat and the Impact on Diversity
In reaction to the complaints filed with OCR and the ensuing investigations, many
institutions fear they are in legal jeopardy and have voluntarily expanded eligibility for
120. Peter Schmidt, U. of Wisconsin Vows to Defend an Aid Program Based on Race,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 22, 2005, at A29.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Peter Schmidt, Bucking a Trend, U. of Wisconsin System Will Defend Race-Based
Student-AidProgram Against Complaint, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 13,2005
(on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
124. This statement is based on my knowledge that the case was still open, based on my
relationship with staff at the University of Wisconsin's Legal Services Department.
125. Peter Schmidt, Justice Dept. Is Expected to Sue Southern Illinois U. over Minority
Fellowships, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 25, 2005, at A34.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Peter Schmidt, Southern Illinois U. Agrees to Justice Department Demands to Open
Programs to All Races, CHRoN. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 26, 2006 (on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
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all race-exclusive programs, including minority-targeted financial aid, before formal
investigations are even launched.' 29 When Carnegie Mellon was challenged early in
2003 by both CEO and ACR regarding its academic summer camps for minority
students, it was initially defiant, and university counsel Mary Jo Dively stated that she
would "not... take the word of some outside group that presumes to tell Carnegie
Mellon what to do"; rather, the institution would wait for federal court guidance.'
30
After the Court issued opinions in the Michigan cases, however, Ms. Dively concluded
that "race-exclusive programs--except in certain extreme factual circumstances-are
not likely to withstand a legal challenge."' 131 In February 2004, Carnegie Mellon not
only opened its summer program to white and Asian students who demonstrated an
ability to contribute to campus diversity, but also opened a full-tuition minority
scholarship program and ended its policy of giving black, Hispanic, and American
Indian students a preference when awarding need-based aid.132 Similarly, Washington
University in St. Louis also initially refused to alter two race-exclusive scholarship
programs in 2004, even when its programs were brought to the attention ofOCR. 133 By
October 2005, however, the university opened both programs for the 2005-2006
school year. As a result, white students have received twelve of forty-two scholarships
offered by one program and five of twenty scholarships offered by the secondprogram. 134
Fear of litigation also resulted in the opening of minority-targeted aid programs at
both Harvard University's business school and Yale University's undergraduate
college.1 35 Similarly, in response to a challenge by the CEO and ACR, Laurence
Pendleton, associate general counsel at Colorado State stated, "[i]t appears that, under
the Michigan cases, race-exclusivity will not pass legal muster.' 3 6 Although the
Massachusetts Institute of Techmology and Saint Louis University initially refused the
demands of ACR and CEO, both institutions backed down when the matter was
referred to OCR.' 37 Saint Louis University ultimately discontinued a program that
awarded thirty scholarships of $11,000 a year to black students, replacing it with a
program that awards scholarships of $8000 to students of any race or ethnicity who
show a commitment to promoting a diverse but unified nation.'
38
As yet another example of early surrender, in January of 2006, the State University
of New York Board of Trustees expanded eligibility for a $6.2 million fellowship
program and a $649,000 scholarship program that had both been originally restricted to
black, Hispanic, and American Indian students.' 3 9 Similarly, the University of
129. Schmidt, supra note 7; see also Peter Schmidt, As Colleges Open Race-Exclusive
Programs to All, Some Minority Students May Be Left Out in the Cold, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), Jan. 26, 2006 (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
130. Schmidt, supra note 7.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id
134. Schmidt, supra note 125.
135. Schmidt, supra note 7.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Schmidt, supra note 125.
139. Id.
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Delaware opened a scholarship program that was reserved for racial and ethnic
minorities to students who are the first generation in their families to attend college,
who are financially needy, or who have experienced challenging life circumstances.14
Some institutions have refused to be intimidated by the challenges, preferring
instead to wait for federal court guidance, or to try to justify the legality of their
programs. In addition to the University of Wisconsin's defiance, Pepperdine University
responded to CEO and ACR allegations that the institution's minority scholarships,
which provide up to $1000 for financially needy minorities, were in violation of the
Supreme Court's rulings in the Michigan cases.141 Pepperdine officials refused to open
the scholarships, asserting that the scholarships are consistent with both the law and the
Christian philosophy followed by the university. 42 In response to Pepperdine's
resistance, CEO and ACR filed complaints with OCR in 2004.143 As of February 2006,
Pepperdine was still in negotiations with OCR regarding its race-exclusive
scholarships. 44 Although also defiant, the University of Missouri at Columbia took a
slightly altered stance, opening some programs reserved for black students to include
"all underrepresented minority students," but refusing to open the programs to white
applicants.
45
Despite the resistance of some institutions, the threat of costly investigations and
litigation has negatively impacted the efforts of colleges and universities to recruit,
retain, and support minority students. In June 2005, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) issued a report asserting that OCR actively discourages colleges from using
minority-targeted policies that are both legally permissible and necessary to close the
achievement gap between white and black students.46 Moreover, because OCR must
investigate every complaint it receives, groups opposed to race-conscious policies have
created a chilling effect simply by threatening to file complaints; in response to the
threats, institutions dismantle their programs to avoid litigation or a time-consuming
OCR investigation, regardless of the legal merit of their programs. 47 Sometimes,
institutions even enter into settlements prior to the release of formal findings by the
government.14
8
Furthermore, OCR has not necessarily been a passive player that merely responds to
complaints. 49 To the contrary, OCR actively encourages institutions to focus on race-
140. Id.
141. Alyson Klein, Foes of Affirmative Action Take Aim at Scholarship Offered by
Pepperdine U, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 23, 2004 (on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Schmidt, supra note 97.
145. Schmidt, supra note 7.
146. Peter Schmidt, Education Department's Actions Contradict Supreme Court's Rulings
on Affirmative Action, Report Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), June 23,2005 (on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
147. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FuND, INC., CLOSING THE GAP: MOVING FROM RHETORIC
TO REALITY IN OPENING DOORS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS 9-10
(2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/gap/Closing-theGap-
Movingf'romRhetoric to_ Reality.pdf.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id.
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neutral alternatives, even in the face of data suggesting that such policies are
insufficient by themselves for closing gaps in enrollment and graduation.' 50 Moreover,
it seems that conservative groups opposed to race-conscious programs have an inside
track at OCR. OCR staff, for example, include prior employees of organizations like
CIR 5'-the same group that represented the plaintiffs in the Michigan cases. 152 LDF
alleges that this connection has led to the divulgence ofnonpublic inside information to
anti-affirmative action groups.'
53
The aggressive threats of litigation by organizations opposed to race-conscious
policies, in combination with OCR's sympathetic ear, have resulted in a dampening of
institutional efforts to attract a diverse group of students though recruitment, retention,
and financial-aid programs, and have depressed minority enrollment. 5 4 As minority-
targeted programs quietly open to nonminority students without expanding in overall
size, the programs serve fewer students from the minority groups that the programs
were initially designed to target, and the programs are less focused on the goals for
which they were first established to achieve.55 The programs also suffer from "benign
neglect," as administrators become distracted by accusations of discrimination and
threats of litigation. 156 As Lee Cokorinos, author of a book researching anti-affirmative
action groups, notes, "[these groups] are on a mission.., to eliminate the gains of the
civil-rights movement."1 57 In light of higher education's retreat from minority-targeted
aid, it would appear that the mission has been successful thus far.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF MINORITY-TARGETED AID
As institutions face increasingly intense scrutiny over their use of minority-targeted
aid, it is important to consider how strict-scrutiny analysis should be applied to the aid,
should a legal challenge reach the Supreme Court. Although current analysis
characterizes minority-targeted aid as an independent, competitive process similar to
admissions, minority-targeted aid is better conceptualized as one step in a multistep
process, used to cultivate a critical mass of minority students by ensuring minority
enrollment.
A. Correctly Conceptualizing Minority-Targeted Aid
Financial aid is often conceptualized as a competitive process that is similar to, but
independent of, the admissions process. Arguably, the financial-aid process is similar
to the admissions process in that they both affect the composition of a student body;
financial aid makes an institution more attractive to potential students, and facilitates
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Jeffrey Selingo, Michigan: Who Really Won?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.),
Jan. 14, 2005, at A21.
153. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 147, at 10.
154. Id.
155. Schmidt, supra note 125.
156. Id.
157. Peter Schmidt, Behind the Fight over Race-Conscious Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 4, 2003, at A22.
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retention by ensuring that students can afford their educations. Even courts have
recognized that one of the most important determinants for the majority of student-
enrollment decisions is the receipt of financial aid.15
Accordingly, it is no surprise that when analyzing the constitutionality of minority-
targeted financial aid today, scholars' 59 and practitioners 160 alike depend on the
Supreme Court's holdings in Grutter and Gratz and apply the analytical framework
outlined in those cases to financial aid as if aid and admission policies implicate the
same goals, benefits, and burdens. Similarly, opponents of minority-targeted aid insist
that the holdings in Grutter and Gratz extend not only to financial aid, but to
intemships, summer programs, and other forms of minority outreach. 16'
Writing for the majority in the Grutter case, Justice O'Connor established that
diversity is a legitimate compelling interest that will justify the use of race in the
admissions process, as long as it is used as one of several competitive "plus" factors.'
6 2
In upholding the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy in Grutter,
the Court deemed the process narrowly tailored because it allowed for individual,
holistic review of each applicant, considered racial and nonracial factors, and placed
no undue burden on nonminority applicants. 163 Moreover, the pursuit of a "critical
mass" of minority students was not the sort of unconstitutional quota barred in Bakke,
but rather a legitimate goal in pursuit of the educational benefits that result from
diversity.164 Writing for the majority in Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist struck down the
undergraduate admissions process because the automatic assignment of twenty points
158. E.g., Geier v. Sundquist, 128 F. Supp. 2d 519, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
159. See BECKMAN, supra note 9 at 102-13 (noting that despite the Court's failure to address
financial aid in the Michigan cases, the standards from the cases continue to be imported to
analysis of minority-targeted financial aid); THE CIviL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4, at 21-22;
Angelo N. Ancheta, After Grutter and Gratz: Higher Education, Race, and the Law, in HIGHER
EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE: COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 175,
186-88 (Gary Orfield, Patricia Marin & Catherine L. Horn eds., 2005) (analogizing minority-
targeted aid to admissions, and concluding that generally race-conscious aid may be permissible,
while race-exclusive aid may not); Jonathan Alger, Putting the Michigan Rulings into Practice,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 25, 2005, at B28 (applying standard of analysis
articulated in Grutter and Gratz to draw legal distinctions between admissions and financial
aid); see also Maurice R. Dyson, Towards an Establishment Clause Theory of Race-Based
Allocation: Administering Race-Conscious FinancialAid After Grutter and Zelman, 14 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 237 (using current interpretation of Grutter and Gratz to assess the viability of
several approaches to minority-targeted aid).
160. See ARTHUR L. COLEMAN, SCOTT. R. PALMER & FEMI S. RICHARDS, HOLLAND & KNIGHT
LLP, FEDERAL LAW AND FINANCIAL AID: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING DIVERSITY-RELATED
PROGRAMS (2005) (using standards set forth in Michigan cases to provide a guide to creating
legal race- and ethnicity-conscious financial aid at colleges and universities); Elizabeth B.
Guerard, The Lingering Question of Race, U. Bus., June 2005, at 35, 35-36 (referring to
interview with education law attorney during which attorney applied questions posted by the
Court in the Michigan cases to minority-targeted financial-aid analysis).
161. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 112 (highlighting comments by Roger Clegg, director of
CEO).
162. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
163. Id. at 337.
164. Id. at 330.
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to minority applicants was an inflexible policy that did not allow for individualized,
holistic assessment. 165 In addition, the automatic point allocation made race a decisive
factor for every minimally qualified minority applicant, thus impermissibly insulating
minority applicants from competition.'
66
Based on the analysis articulated in the two cases, analysis of minority-targeted aid
typically concludes that the aid can only be awarded in a process that uses race as one
of many factors for consideration. Similar to the quotas struck down in Bakke and the
points automatically allocated to minorities in the Gratz case, race-exclusive aid is
deemed unconstitutional. 167 OCR has endorsed this analysis by characterizing race-
exclusive aid programs as "extremely difficult to defend."'
168
Minority-targeted financial aid, however, is placed in the wrong analytical context
when the aid is conceptualized as a process independent from admissions. The
legitimate pursuit of a critical mass of minority students, in order to reap the benefits of
a diverse student body, is a multistep effort. Step one is admission of minority students
through an admissions process guided by the analytical framework established in
Grutter and Gratz. The second step focuses on actually enrolling a critical mass of
minority students, a goal that is often unattainable without the support of aid. Minority-
targeted aid, then, is a tool used in the second step. The correct analytical context for
minority-targeted aid conceptualizes the aid as an enrollment-management tool, used to
give effect to admission decisions.
B. Minority-Targeted Aid as an Enrollment-Management Tool
Enrollment management is defined as "an organizational concept and a systematic
set of activities designed to enable educational institutions to exert more influence over
their student enrollments. ' 69 Using institutional research, colleges and universities
assess the social forces that affect student retention 70 and develop marketing,
recruiting, and financial-aid strategies that best position institutions in the marketplace
to secure desired student enrollment. 17 The enrollment-management movement is a
recent phenomenon, which included the reemergence of merit-based awards during the
late 1970s and the continued prominence of merit aid throughout the 1990s as a way to
compete for students. The use of merit aid as a competitive tool is usually driven by (1)
the desire of an institution of lower reputation to lure students away from more
165. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
166. Id. at272.
167. See, e.g., Ancheta, supra note 159, at 186-88 (analogizing minority-targeted aid to
admissions to conclude that, generally, race-conscious aid may be permissible, while race-
exclusive aid may not).
168. Schmidt, supra note 7.
169. Don Hossler, The Role of Financial Aid in Enrollment Management, NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR STUDENT SERVICES, Spring 2000, at 77, 78 (quoting DON HOSSLER & JOHN P. BEAN, THE
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS 5 (1990)).
170. Id.
171. Michael D. Coomes, The Historical Roots of Enrollment Management, NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES, Spring 2000, at 5, 13.
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prestigious institutions and (2) competition among schools of equal prestige or
reputation to enroll the most qualified candidates.
7 2
The use of minority-targeted aid as an enrollment-management tool is driven by a
third desire on the part of institutions: to attract and enroll qualified and diverse
candidates. Minority-targeted aid makes education more affordable for admitted
minorities, enhances an institution's reputation in the minority community, and
positively impacts recruiting and enrollment efforts. The existence of minority-targeted
aid also serves important administrative and fundraising functions. As such, minority-
targeted aid enables institutions to realize their goal of attracting and enrolling a
critical mass of minority students.
1. Affordability
In light of rising tuition costs, the provision of additional aid to minorities is
particularly important if an institution wishes to ensure enrollment of a critical mass of
minority students. The price of secondary education has risen steeply during the last
three decades; between 1976 and 2004, the average tuition at public and private four-
year institutions increased 732% and 693%, respectively. 73 Moreover, research
suggests a strong relationship between financial aid and educational attainment, with
financial aid heavily influencing a student's choice of institution, a student's decision
to enroll, and a student's ability to persist and attain a bachelor's degree.174 The
Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance has found that 96% of students
with low unmet need enroll in some form of postsecondary education within two years
of graduating from high school. 17 5 In contrast, only 78% of students with high unmet
need attended college within the same time frame. 176 Furthermore, equally qualified
students with high unmet need were only one-third as likely to graduate from college as
students with low unmet need.
177
Reports from the Advisory Committee in 2002 also concluded that more than
150,000 college-qualified students do not enroll each year in any postsecondary
education because of a lack of financial aid, a situation which the Committee described
as an "affordability crisis" for low-income students.178 In 2003, 80% of college-
qualified high school graduates from families with incomes above $78,800 enrolled in
college within a year of graduation, while only 61% of graduates from middle-income
families, and 48% of graduates from families with incomes below $48,400 enrolled. 7 9
172. MICHAEL S. McPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPiRO, THE STuDENT AI GAME 109-10
(1998).
173. Donald E. Heller, Can Minority Students Afford College in an Era of Skyrocketing
Tuition?, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 159, at 83, 83.
174. Derek V. Price & Jill K. Wohlford, Equity in Educational Attainment: Racial, Ethnic,
and Gender Inequality in the 50 States, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE, supra note
159, at 59, 63-64.
175. Heller, supra note 173, at 94.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Price & Wohlford, supra note 174, at 63-64.
179. Sandy Baum, Lowering Work and Loan Burden: The Current Status of Student
Reliance on Grants, Loans, and Work, in REFLECTIONS ON COLLEGE ACcEss & PERSISTENCE 62,
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Students from low-income families are particularly reluctant to take on loans to ensure
their matriculation, and with good reason. Students hailing from low-income families
have a more difficult time repaying loans than those from middle-income or high-
income families with similar levels of debt and postcollege earnings because they are
less likely to receive assistance from family members, and they are more likely to have
responsibility for supporting their families of origin afer graduation.'8 Accordingly, it
is no surprise that a 1995 GAO report found that every $1000 increase in loans results
in a 3% increase in student dropout rates, which mainly aversely affected low-income
students.' 81 Working during college is similarly problematic for low-income students
who cannot obtain sufficient grant or work-study aid. Although studies have found that
limited on-campus work can help with persistence and academic achievement, as hours
worked increases, year-to-year persistence and likelihood ofcompletion of a bachelor's
degree are negatively affected.' 82
The affordability crisis is compounded for minorities. The 2000 Census reported
that although the median income for white families in 1999 was $54,698, the median
incomes for black, Native American, and Hispanic families were all below $35,000.' 3
Among 1992 high school graduates, 54% of African-American students were low-
income, as opposed to only 21% of white students.' 84 In addition, the ability of
minority families to pay for higher education has not risen commensurate with
increases in price, particularly when compared with white families. Between 1999 and
2003, the median income for white families grew by 11%, while the median income for
Blacks and Hispanics grew by only 8%.185 Minority students are more likely to come
from low-income families less able to afford higher education, and they are also likely
to be more price-responsive to tuition than white and middle- or upper-income
students, an issue reflected in the disproportionate representation of minority students
in community colleges. 186 As such, need-based aid awards have a stronger influence on
educational attainment for minorities than loans or work-study awards. 87 Indeed, when
challenged by OCR regarding its race-exclusive scholarships in 1997, Florida Atlantic
University reported that most entering black students would not have matriculated
without scholarships. 88 For these reasons, the maintenance of aid specifically for
minorities is necessary.
The affordability crisis for minorities, however, is not just limited to low-income
students. African-American students, regardless of family-income levels, are less
willing to finance their education through loans because they are more doubtful of the
62 (Advisory Comm. on Student Fin. Assistance ed., 2006).
180. Id. at 67.
181. See Robert DeBard, Alternative Financing Methods for College, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR
STUDENT SERVICES, Spring 2000, at 47, 49 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER
EDUCATION: RESTRUCTURING STUDENT AID COULD REDUCE Low-INCOME COLLEGE STUDENT
DROPOUT RATES (1995)).
182. Seeid. at 50-51.
183. Heller, supra note 173, at 83-84.
184. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 147, at 5.
185. Heller, supra note 173, at 100.
186. Seeid. at86.
187. Id.
188. Letter from Barbara Shannon, supra note 105.
[Vol. 85:851
DOG WAGS TAIL
ultimate benefits. 18 9 Although white students are also negatively influenced by debt and
living costs, black students value student aid in their college choice more than white
students and are more vulnerable to pricing and living costs than other ethnic groups.'
90
Latino students are similarly less likely to finance their education through loans, opting
instead to work. 9'
Research also suggests that middle-income minorities are systematically financially
disadvantaged, particularly when compared to their white counterparts. Black middle-
class professionals, for example, tend to be concentrated in the least remunerative
professions upon completing their educations,' 92 making loan repayment after
graduation more difficult. Income security for black middle-class families is also less
stable than that of white middle-class families. Not only is a black family's high
income at a particular point in time less predictive of permanent high earnings than the
high income of a white family, but black middle-class families are also more likely than
white middle-class families to be dependent on the income of two working spouses. 9
3
In contrast, white middle-class families are more likely to be dependent on the earnings
of one spouse, leaving the income potential of the second spouse untapped and on
reserve in case of a financial emergency.194 Because black middle-class status'is more
likely to be based on the income of both spouses, the income of the second wage earner
in black middle-class families often finances the costs of the second wage earner's
participation in the work force, including clothing, transportation, and child care. 95
Furthermore, wealth accumulation for black middle-class families is not on par with
that of white middle-class families. Black middle-class status is more likely than white
middle-class status to be based on income instead of wealth. Accordingly, black
middle-class families own only fifteen cents for every dollar owned by white middle-
class families. 96 Similarly, although median income of black middle-class families is
about 64% of median white middle-class family income, median black-family net
worth is only 12% of white-family net worth. 97 Because black middle-class families
are also more likely to live in less affluent neighborhoods with close proximity to poor,
black enclaves, black middle-class families do not capture as much value appreciation
of their homes as do white middle-class families. 98 Accordingly, black families have
less income surplus to share with children as parents approach retirement, and are thus
less likely to transmit their tenuous middle-class status to the next generation.
99
Finally, black middle-class families, as much as 80% of whom are the first in their
189. DeBard, supra note 181, at 49.
190. Edward P. St. John, The Impact of Student Aid on Recruitment andRetention: What the
Research Indicates, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES, Spring 2000, at 61, 71.
191. Id. at 71.
192. Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 939, 975 (1997).
193. Id. at 976-77.
194. Id. at 977.
195. Id. at 977.
196. Id. at983.
197. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WIUTE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 48 (2004).
198. See Malamud, supra note 192, at 972.
199. Id. at 985.
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families to attain middle-class status, are expected to support those extended family
members who have not attained the same status.200 As a result, less money is available
to pay for the costs of higher education.20 1 This expectation of support is particularly
taxing when minority students graduate and are expected to both pay back student
loans and support extended family.
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) forms and financial-aid
formulas do not account for these additional social forces that impact a minority
student's ability to finance higher education. FAFSA forms, for example, do not
consider home equity as a financial resource for higher education,2 2 and thus, they
mask the additional financial resources more likely to be available to white families.
Minority-targeted aid, then, acts as an enrollment-management tool that justifiably
acknowledges, and responds to, the social forces that affect enrollment.
Using financial aid to encourage enrollment by particular students has been
generally criticized as an entitlement to those students who can attend college without
the additional aid.203 Those minority students, however, who appear to be middle-
income on paper, may not actually be so in fact, making loans more burdensome and
harder to pay back than loans obtained by nonminority students and their parents.
Accordingly, the critique of merit aid as an unjustified entitlement is not necessarily
applicable to minority-targeted aid. By providing aid sufficient to assuage heightened
price sensitivities of both low-income and middle-income minority students, minority-
targeted aid serves as a particularly effective and necessary enrollment-management
tool to ensure the enrollment of a critical mass of minority students.
2. Reputation, Recruitment & Enrollment
Enrollment-management tools also encompass techniques that enhance an
institution's reputation and result in effective recruitment.204 The existence of minority-
targeted aid positively influences an institution's reputation regarding racial climate.
College officials interviewed by the GAO in 1994 reported that minority-targeted aid
sent a message to potential students that their institution was serious about wanting
minorities to enroll and ultimately graduate.20 5 The aid provided tangible evidence,
more concrete than an affirmative action statement, that an institution supported
diversity.
20 6
The effect on reputation makes it more likely that minorities will even apply in the
first place. In its guide on minority-targeted aid, the Department of Education
200. Id. at 983-84.
201. Id.; see also ROTHSTImN, supra note 197, at 48 (explaining that because of the
expectation of support to extended family, black families have less income available to spend on
children than white families with the same total income).
202. See McPHERSON & ScHAPmiO, supra note 172, at 35.
203. Heller, supra note 173, at 90-91 (explaining that based on the high correlation between
socioeconomic status and the academic criteria on which merit aid is often based, the benefits
usually flow to middle- and upper-income families).
204. See Coomes, supra note 171, at 13.
205. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MiNORrry-
TARGETED ScHoLARSmiPS 10 (1994).
206. Id.
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explained that a failure to attract a sufficient number of minority applicants who meet
an institution's academic qualifications makes it impossible for an institution to enroll a
diverse student body, even if race is given a competitive "plus" in the admissions
process. 20 7 This assertion is underscored by an examination of the effects of
Proposition 209 on applications to California institutions of higher education. In 1996,
successful adoption of the California public referendum banned the use of all racial and
ethnic preferences in public colleges and government agencies throughout the state.
20°
The effects of Proposition 209 on enrollment throughout the state university system,
particularly at the state's elite universities, were dramatic. By 2006, minority
enrollment across the entire state university system had declined by 30%.2o
Perhaps more telling for purposes of enrollment management, however, was the
decline in applications to both U.C. Berkeley and the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA). In 1995, the percentage of applications received by Berkeley and
UCLA from African-American students was 5.8% and 6.0%, respectively. 2 10 The
percentage of applications received from Hispanic students was 13.4% and 16.1%,
respectively. 211 After Proposition 209 was passed in 1996, applications received from
both groups plummeted. The percentage of applications received by Berkeley from
African-American students immediately decreased in 1996 to 5.3%, and dropped to a
low of 4.2% in 1999, before beginning to climb back up to 4.6% in 2001.212 The
percentage of applications to Berkeley from Hispanic students dropped to 12.4% in
1996, and continued to a low of 10.5% in 1999, before climbing back up to 13.1% in
2001.213 Similarly, at UCLA, the percentage of applications received from African-
American students immediately dropped to 5.6% in 1996, and continued to decrease to
a low of 4.2% in 1999, before climbing up to 4.4% in 2001.214 The percentage of
applications received from Hispanic students decreased to 14.7% in 1996, continuing
to a low of 13.1% in 1999, before increasing in 2001 to 15.3%.215 The dips in
percentages of applications received from the groups are not only a potential indication
of how discouraged minority students were regarding their prospects of admissions
after Proposition 209, but also a possible indication of an unwillingness by minorities
to even consider attending institutions they perceived to be unwelcoming. Minority-
targeted aid can change student perception and encourage applications by sending a
message regarding an institution's commitment to diversity.
207. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 (Feb. 23, 1994) The Department based the permissibility of race-
exclusive scholarships on this explanation. Id.
208. See LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIvERsJrY: AN ORGANIZED CHALLENGE TO
RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE 32 (2003).
209. BECKMAN, supra note 9, at 49.
210. CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, THE CivEL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD
UNIV., PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES'
EXPERIENCES 36 (2003).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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Finally, the existence of minority-targeted aid even has an effect on the enrollment
of minority students who do not receive additional aid. Institutions of higher education
report that minority students who do not receive minority-targeted aid are nevertheless
more likely to enroll upon realizing that those minority students whose enrollment is
guaranteed by the provision of aid will be attending. 1 6 This is so because the students
believe they are less likely to be isolated and therefore more likely to persist in their
studies.2 17 This chain-reaction effect in response to the provision of minority-targeted
aid enables institutions to recruit and enroll a critical mass of minority students, and it
further illustrates why minority-targeted aid is an enrollment management tool that can
effectively ensure sufficient enrollment of minority students.
3. Administration
Finally, there are administrative reasons to specifically reserve funding for minority-
targeted aid. At any institution with a finite amount of resources, it is necessary to
decide which resources will be allocated to projects that support the institution's
development goals. If an institution is committed to enrolling a critical mass of
minority students who will need additional aid to secure enrollment, it is only logical
that institutions ensure that the additional aid is indeed available. Best practices for
financial-aid management dictate that financial-aid directors prepare annual plans
which detail the utilization of financial-aid funds.218 The plans should not only identify
funding sources for financial aid, but they should also outline the demand for financial
aid likely to be generated by each category of students and should allocate available
resources against projected demand.219 Financial-aid offices should also ensure that
awards are maximally utilized without overexpenditure, and reconcile amounts
awarded from each funding source with the fiscal records of the institution. 220 These
best practices require the sequestration of funds particularly for minority-targeted aid.
Moreover, limited resources dictate that funding for particular goals are reserved in
order to ensure that sufficient funding is ultimately available. Public institutions, in
particular, have been experiencing expanding enrollment and decreased state
appropriations. 221 As state governments are less able to subsidize the costs of higher
education at state institutions, state legislatures and institutions must make decisions
about the development goals to which they are financially committed.222 Reserving
funding for particular development goals ensures that sufficient financial resources are
gathered and that the resources are not used for purposes other than that for which they
were originally intended.
216. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 205, at 10.
217. Id.
218. See THOMAS E. TELLEFSEN, IMPROVING COLLEGE MANAGEMENT: AN INTEGRATED
SYSTEMS APPROACH 285-86 (1990).
219. Id. at 286.
220. See id.
221. 1 ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM, JANE W. WELLMAN, MELISSA E. CLINEDINST & JAMIE P.
MERISOTIS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NCES 2002-157, STUDY OF COLLEGE COSTS AND PRICES,
1988-89 TO 1997-98 (2001).
222. See THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING How AMERICANS PAY FOR
COLLEGE 59 (1999).
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In addition, reserving funds for targeted purposes serves as a marketing tool that
attracts donors willing to support an institutional project. Donors are increasingly
unwilling to pledge funding for general purposes, insisting instead that their money be
used for a particular purpose of their choosing. Donors who make significant
contributions to scholarship funds desire higher levels of accountability and often make
donations coupled with specific conditions and instructions regarding how the gift is to
be used. In response to this trend, institutions attract donors by characterizing funds by
a specific purpose, cause, or development goal.223 Alternately, institutions engage in
"targeted asks" campaigns, through which institutions solicit donations from alumni for
specific purposes; such campaigns yield higher returns, as donors are more likely to
give to a specific program or fund than they are to give to an institution's general
discretionary fund.224 Accordingly, if institutions depend on donations to support their
minority-targeted aid program, which in turn augments the amount of aid available for
all students, best practices dictate that funding for the aid be reserved and clearly
identified as such.
C. Strict Scrutiny of Minority-Targeted Aid as an Enrollment-Management Tool
When correctly conceptualized as an enrollment-management tool, minority-
targeted financial aid is not an independent competitive process subject to the same
strict-scrutiny analysis to which race-conscious admissions policies are subject under
the Grutter and Gratz cases. Rather, minority-targeted aid is the second step in the
overall effort to cultivate diverse student bodies, and it enables institutions to enroll the
students they have already admitted under a Grutter-compliant admissions process.
Institutions already use aid as an enrollment-management tool through the distribution
of merit aid, a practice that has received scant constitutional scrutiny. Among private
four-year institutions, 66% give merit-based aid to students who are academically
talented, without any regard for need.225 Similarly, 26% of public four-year institutions
provide merit aid based on academic ability.226 It is not uncommon for institutions to
provide tuition discounts as high as 25% to 30%,227 thereby making an institution
particularly attractive to students receiving the aid and increasing the likelihood of
student enrollment.
Minority-targeted aid similarly makes an institution attractive to minority students
who are offered the aid. First, minority-targeted aid enhances the institution's
reputation for racial climate, making it more likely that minority students will apply
and, if admitted, enroll. Once a minority student has been legitimately admitted under a
Grutter-compliant admissions process, an institution can then individually assess
whether financial need that was not reflected on FAFSA forms must be met in order to
effectuate enrollment. If additional aid is necessary, as is more likely to be the case
with both low-income and middle-income minorities, and the institution considers the
223. Interview with Anonymous Development Program Manager, Top Tier Law School
(June 8, 2007).
224. Id.
225. WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN A. KuRZwEIL, EUGENE M. TOBIN & SUSANNEC. PICHLER,
EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 188 (2005).
226. Id.
227. Hossler, supra note 169, at 83.
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student a particularly desirable addition to the entering class, funds that have been
reserved specifically for this purpose are used to secure enrollment.
Critics of minority-targeted aid are sure to frame minority-targeted aid as a "set
aside" that unduly burdens nonminorities denied access to additional funds. Opponents
will argue that race-exclusive funds, in particular, are unconstitutional and that race-
conscious funds can only be distributed if race is one of many factors used to select
award recipients. Accordingly, it is appropriate to examine if, and how, strict-scrutiny
analysis yields different results when applied to minority-targeted aid used for
enrollment-management purposes.
1. Compelling Interest
Under strict scrutiny, the use of race by an institution of higher education that
receives federal funds must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest.228 The Court has affirmed two compelling interests justifying the use of race in
higher education: (1) an institution's interest in remedying the effects of that
institution's own past racial discrimination, 229 and (2) an institution's interest in
cultivating a diverse student body.230 The Court's position, however, is shortsighted.
In affirming an institution's interest in remedying the effects of that institution's
own past racial discrimination, the Court has insisted that remediation of de facto
discrimination2 3 ' and societal discrimination 232 does not rise to the level of a
228. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978).
229. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that the City
failed to prove that its affirmative action program was remedying the effects of the City's past
discrimination in the construction industry); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (holding that societal discrimination, absent a showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit, was an insufficiently compelling interest which would allow for the use of
racial classifications).
230. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978).
231. In order to prove a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination, government
entities must provide specific proof illustrating their past practice of discrimination and the
present effects of that discrimination. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 497-98 (striking down a
plan requiring city contractors to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract
to minority business enterprises because the city failed to prove it was remedying the present
effects of the city's own discrimination in the construction industry or identifiable
discrimination by contractors in Richmond's local market); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76
(holding that absent a showing of prior discrimination from the Jackson School Board, racial
classifications used in a collective bargaining agreement designed to provide minorities
preferential treatment in the event of layoffs was impermissible). As such, the Supreme Court
has adopted a "strong basis in evidence" rule in remedial cases to ensure that an institution's
motivation in remedying discrimination is neither insincere nor a pretext for a more invidious
motivation. THE CivhL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4, at 4 n. 13.
232. In Bakke, the University of California, Davis medical school's admissions policy set
aside sixteen out of one hundred seats in the entering class for disadvantaged minority
applicants. Although a five-member plurality ultimately held that the use of race as one of many
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compelling interest. Assuming, however, that a public institution is willing to admit to
past racial discrimination, the "strong basis in evidence" 233 standard adopted by the
Court, requiring government entities to provide specific proof illustrating their past
practice of discrimination and the present effects of that discrimination, is not always
easily met. 3
Moreover, institutions are not only occupied with remedying the present effects of
past discrimination. Institutions of higher education, for example, may also have an
interest in remedying de facto discrimination caused by standardized testing. Students
and prominent civil-rights organizations intervened in the Michigan affirmative action
cases, submitting amicus briefs characterizing the standardized tests on which
admissions committees rely as tools of a "racial caste system" that keeps Blacks and
Latinos in inferior schools and jobs.235 As such, the use by institutions of higher
education of racially-biased admission criteria perpetuated de facto segregation in
primary and secondary education, college, and graduate schools, as well as
discrimination in the workplace. 236 Accordingly, affirmative action was necessary to
offset discrimination that universities engaged in as a result of their unwillingness to
abandon their admission practices.
Indeed, other scholars have examined admissions criteria, finding that the
selection frameworks used by elite institutions in particular are arbitrary and
exclusionary systems that deny advancement not only to racial and gender minorities,
but also to poor and working-class Americans of all groups. 237 Scholastic Aptitude
Tests (SAT) given to high school students, for example, have been shown to correlate
poorly with freshman grades, prompting some researchers to note that there is a better
factors in a competitive admissions process was constitutionally permissible, the Court
nevertheless decided that helping certain groups the medical school perceived to be victims of
general societal discrimination did not constitute a compelling interest that could justify the
school's use of race in the admissions process. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310, 320. The Court went on
to affirm its holding that societal discrimination cannot justify affirmative action policies in two
subsequent employment cases: JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 498, and Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
233. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 4, at 4 n. 13.
234. Such was the case in Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994). In
Podberesky, the University of Maryland sought to defend a minority-targeted scholarship by
arguing, among other things, that the scholarship was needed to remedy the disproportionately
high attrition rates of black students; the university believed the rate to be directly attributable to
the university's segregated past and hostile racial climate. Id In rejecting the remediation of
high attrition rates as a compelling interest, the Fourth Circuit cited concerns regarding the
accuracy of statistics presented and the failure of the university to conclusively prove that the
hostile climate had an effect on attrition rates. Id. at 156. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
therby allowing the Fourth Circuit's ruling to stand. Kirwan v. Podberesky, 514 U.S. 1128
(1995).
235. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case ofAffirmative
Action, 105 CoLuM. L. REv. 1436, 1461 (2005).
236. Id.
237. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BuFF. L. REv. 1155, 1194 n.217
(2008) ("Although law schools no longer make exclusionary admissions decisions based on
race, sex, or class, modem law school admissions criteria and ranking mechanisms have the
same limiting effect.").
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correlation between weight and height.238 Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores
are no exception, with a study of the University of Pennsylvania Law School finding
that LSAT scores were a weak predictor of law school performance, explaining only
14% and 15% of the differences in first- and second-year law school grades,
respectively.239 It has long been understood that standardized test scores do, however,
correlate closely with parental income, 240 thereby disadvantaging both women and
minorities, two groups that are overrepresented in lower socioeconomic brackets. 24'
Despite the evidence supporting the intervenors' claims, the Court failed to address the
"cultural .. .and economic biases" 242 imbedded in standardized tests that have a
disparate impact on minorities; even the Justices who supported race-conscious
admissions policies failed to respond to the intervenors' arguments.243
The de facto discriminatory effects of test scores in university admissions do not
qualify as the present effects of past de jure discrimination, but they are nevertheless
compelling because the impact on minorities is the same; overreliance on the tests
excludes minority students. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to recognize de
facto discrimination as a compelling interest that survives strict scrutiny. By embracing
a distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination and disregarding the reality
that inequality stems from both types of discrimination, the Court ignores the fact that
racial bias is not always the result of overt government policy, but the result of myriad
local, state, and federal laws and policies that, although difficult to prove, are
sometimes covertly motivated by racial animus. Moreover, decisions that produce
genuinely unintended racial consequences, however innocent, can often reflect
unconscious bias traceable to the legacy of racial oppression with which our country
has struggled since its inception. Most importantly, however, the harm from an equal
protection violation is not the act of discrimination per se, but rather the inequality that
results from the discrimination. The harm of that inequality is identical, whether
produced by de jure or de facto discrimination, government action or government
inaction. In both cases, racial minorities bear the burden of that harm in violation of the
spirit of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's false distinction between dejure and
de facto discrimination fails to acknowledge that burden.
The Court's rejection of a compelling interest in remedying societal discrimination
is also problematic. In addition to their arguments regarding de facto discrimination
and disparate racial impact, intervenors in the Michigan cases also argued that
imbalance in higher education is caused by societal discrimination against minorities
and that affirmative action which results in increased minority access to higher
education corrects the imbalance by redistributing opportunities, status, and political
238. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953,971 (1996) (quoting DAVIDOWENs,NONEOFTHEABOVE:
BEHND THE MYTH OF SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE 207 (1985)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 987-92.
241. Id. at 993.
242. Paula C. Johnson, Jam Tomorrow & Jam Yesterday: Reflections on Grutter, Gratz and
the Future of Affirmative Action, JURIST, Sept. 5, 2003, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/
symposium-aa/johnson.php.
243. Brown-Nagin, supra note 235, at 1485-86.
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power.244 The majority opinion in Grutter, however, failed to acknowledge these
arguments, leaving Justice Ginsburg to file concurring (in Grutter) and dissenting (in
Gratz) opinions in which she provided a detailed outline of the societal discrimination
against people of color that justifies affirmative action.245
Most recently, the Court encountered societal discrimination as a potentially
compelling interest in the education context in the Seattle School District?46 case. In
implementing controlled-choice integration plans, the Seattle, Washington, and
Jefferson County, Kentucky, school districts were motivated by a desire to reduce
racial isolation in their public schools and avoid the negative impact on academic
outcomes that segregated educational settings have on minority children.247 By
implementing the plans, the districts sought to achieve educational equity by ensuring
that minority students were not academically disadvantaged by attending majority-
minority schools which tend to replicate, in the form of under-resourced schools,
inferior learning materials, and concentrations of poverty, the disadvantage and
discrimination that minorities encounter in broader society.248 Despite the legitimacy of
the districts' concerns, the Supreme Court failed to definitively address whether there
was a compelling interest in eliminating racial isolation. In doing so, the Court
implicitly reaffirmed earlier pronouncements that attempts to address the
manifestations of societal discrimination are not compelling interests that justify
affirmative action.
249
In preferring diversity to other remedial interests, the Court gives undue importance
to the burden that might be shouldered by a majority group in the implementation of
remedial policies. At the same time, the Court ignores the continuing societal bias that
minorities face, as indicated by the failure of more than two Justices to concur in the
account of enduring societal racial bias that Justice Ginsburg outlined in her dissenting
opinion in Gratz.250 This failure has prompted scholars like Derrick Bell to argue that a
focus on diversity allows courts and policy makers to avoid the truth about past and
244. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 235, at 1455-56.
245. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
247. Id. at 711-18.
248. See Brief for Respondents at 28-3 1, Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-
908); Brief for Respondents at 27-29, Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (No. 05-915).
249. A plurality of the Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito, declined to even consider whether there was a compelling interest in using integration
to reduce racial isolation, suggesting that even if addressing the isolation was a compelling
interest, the controlled-choice plans were insufficiently narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 725-27. Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which he characterized the four Justices in
the plurality as too dismissive of a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring equal
educational opportunity. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy also found the plans insufficiently narrowly tailored,
stating that racial classifications in school assignments can only be used as a "last resort." Id. at
786-87. Thus, the Court failed to clearly address the legitimacy of social equality as a
compelling interest.
250. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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continuing racial discrimination. 251 Instead of accepting that truth as justification for a
remedial interest in affirmative action, a focus on diversity encourages continued
denial and is upheld because of its benefit to Whites, rather than its benefit to
Blacks.252 As such, minorities are only "fortuitous beneficiaries" of a policy goal that is
subject to change when the majority asserts different priorities,253 while the focus on
diversity legitimizes the tendency of institutions of higher education to place burdens
on minority candidates (the burden of diversifying a community), while failing to place
similar burdens on white candidates.
254
A focus on diversity also allows colleges and universities to continue to give
"undeserved legitimacy" to grades and tests scores that favor the privileged, instead of
reducing their reliance on these methods and finding fairer standards by which to
screen applicants. 25 5 And as long as admissions criteria like standardized tests continue
to have a disparate impact on minorities, 256 the diversity rationale makes it difficult for
affirmative action proponents to defend the programs whenever institutions deviate
from standard patterns of selection in order to compensate for the disparate impact.
25 7
At the same time, diversity as a compelling interest does have its benefits. Although
it is true that the premium diversity places on a student's background may make
diversity politically unpalatable for those groups that are overrepresented in higher
education, diversity's basis on inclusion frees it from the demographic caps that may
accompany remedial interests. Accordingly, an institution is not forced to suspend
focus on a minority group just because proportional representation of that group in an
institution implies that prior discrimination has been remedied.
In addition, diversity does allow, indeed encourages, institutions to not only
consider racial minorities, but many historically disadvantaged groups in the
admissions process-a policy that may be more politically palatable to the public. That
accomplishment, however, is at the cost of an open and frank conversation about the
place of race in our national history and what remains to be done to overcome its
damaging legacy. Broader interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, including a
different level of Supreme Court scrutiny for remedial programs and recognition of de
facto and societal discrimination as compelling interests satisfying strict scrutiny, can
provide additional support for affirmative action. Although rejected by the Court, these
interpretations are considered persuasive by local decision makers and have been
recognized by dissenting Justices in Supreme Court cases addressing affirmative
action.2
58
Despite its shortcomings, when the Court in Grutter upheld the pursuit of a diverse
student body as a compelling interest, which could justify the use of race in the
admission process, it relied heavily on the substantial educational benefits that
251. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 CoLuM. L. REv. 1622 (2003).
252. Id. at 1625.
253. Id.
254. See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. COLO. L. REv. 939, 961 (1997).
255. Bell, supra note 251, at 1629-31.
256. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
257. Malamud, supra note 254, at 961.
258. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
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diversity confers.259 These benefits included the breakdown of racial stereotypes, the
promotion of cross-racial understanding, and more spirited and enlightening classroom
discussion.260 The Court also relied on testimony from law school officials that a
"critical mass," defined as "meaningful numbers" or "meaningful representation" 261 of
minorities, is necessary to promote the benefits of diversity in general and the
breakdown of racial stereotypes in particular.262 Based on this testimony, the Court
endorsed the law school's pursuit of a "critical mass" as constitutionally legitimate,263
acknowledging that there is some relationship between numbers and achieving the
benefits of diversity. 264 As such, paying attention to numbers does not necessarily
constitute a quota.265 Rather, the institution has a right to pursue the goal of critical
mass by reference to a numerical range, within which the benefits of diversity would be
realized.266
The Court also referred to the First Amendment rights implicated when institutions
select students for admission.267 Originally explained in Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion, on which the Grutter Court relied heavily, academic freedom encompasses the
right of an institution to make its own judgments regarding the education it provides,
including the selection of its student body.268 Although it must be balanced with the
constitutional limitations that protect individual rights, an institution's effort to
cultivate a diverse student body is of "paramount importance" to fulfilling its
educational mission.
269
The concepts of critical mass and academic freedom must affirm not just an
institution's right to admit students the institution believes will contribute to diversity,
but an institution's right to attract those students in the first place and later ensure their
matriculation. Justice O'Connor's affirmation of both a compelling interest in diversity
and of the benefits of diversity is meaningless unless diverse students actually apply,
gain admission, and ultimately enroll. Accordingly, the compelling interest is not just
the goal of diversity but the pursuit of diversity as well. By responding to the unique
social issues regarding race and class with which minority applicants often grapple,
minority-targeted financial aid gives effect to admissions decisions so that diverse
student populations may actually be realized. Like the use of race in admissions to
cultivate diversity, the use of minority-targeted aid as an enrollment-management tool
to cultivate diversity is legitimate under the Court's diversity rationale.
259. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
260. Id. at 330.
261. Id. at318.
262. Id. at 319-20.
263. Id. at316.
264. Id. at 336.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 324.
268. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 313.
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2. Narrow Tailoring
Narrow tailoring refers to the Court's assessment of whether there is an appropriate
"fit" between a compelling government interest and the action taken to advance that
interest. The purpose of this inquiry is to ensure that there is "little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification [based on race or ethnicity is an] illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype., 270 Although the Supreme Court has never offered a precise
test for narrow tailoring, Court precedents have considered various factors in assessing
the extent to which a race-conscious program is narrowly tailored. There has been
overlap in the use of narrow tailoring factors in both the Court's remedial and diversity
cases,271 but the only diversity cases to specifically address narrow tailoring in higher
education are Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,272 Justice Powell considered
two major factors in determining whether an admissions policy designed to promote
diversity in higher education was narrowly tailored: (1) whether the admissions policy
relied on quotas or separate tracks that insulated minorities from review; and (2)
whether race was a determinative factor in the admissions process, or merely one of
several factors considered in a process that evaluates each applicant individually.
273
To assess the race-conscious admissions policies at the University of Michigan, the
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger affirmed the use of both of
Powell's factors, and considered three additional factors, to create a more extensive list
of narrow-tailoring factors that includes (1) whether the process provides flexible,
individualized review for all applicants; (2) whether the process offers a competitive
review of all applicants that does not utilize quotas or separate tracks to insulate
minorities; (3) whether the institution has considered race-neutral alternatives; (4)
whether the use of race unduly burdens nonminorities; and (5) whether the use of race
is limited in time.274
Assuming an institution can successfully demonstrate a commitment to achieving
diversity, the crux of the analysis when assessing the permissibility of minority-
targeted aid will likely be whether the aid is narrowly tailored. As articulated in
Grutter, "context matters," and when applying strict scrutiny to race-based government
actions, courts must take into account relevant differences in situations.275 Accordingly,
270. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)).
271. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (striking
down remedial programs, in part, because the programs had no "logical stopping point," a factor
the Court would examine in the Grutter case); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 177-78,
182-83 (1987) (assessing "flexib[ility]," considering the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives,
and assessing burden on third parties, three factors which would be later considered in Grutter
and Gratz); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275,280-81 (1986) (considering a
program's "logical stopping point" and the burden placed on third-party non-beneficiaries of the
program, both factors which would later be considered in Grutter and Gratz).
272. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
273. See id. at 317-19.
274. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-43; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-75 (2003).
275. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
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the differences between the admissions process and the aid process will feature
prominently in any narrow-tailoring analysis of minority-targeted aid.
i. Individualized Review
The concerns highlighted in Bakke regarding individualized review centered on
preventing race from becoming determinative in the admissions process, on providing
an individualized review to each applicant, and on cultivating "genuine" diversity that
encompassed the many ways in which students contribute to diversity through
alternative perspectives.2 7 6 The Court in Grutter affirmed Powell's vision of a
constitutionally permissible admissions process, upholding the law school's use of race
as a "plus" factor.277 Unlike the undergraduate admissions process that was struck
down in Gratz, the law school did not automatically award a mechanical or
predetermined diversity "bonus" that incorrectly assumed that a racial or ethnic
characteristic "ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to ... diversity. 278
The same concerns are not necessarily implicated when considering minority-
targeted aid used as an enrollment-management tool. The Court's guidelines regarding
individualized review address how diversity is conceptualized and the extent to which
institutions can use race or ethnicity as a marker of diversity. The distribution of
minority-targeted aid, however, is a postadmissions process; minority-targeted aid
programs are responsive to the financial needs of students who have already been
admitted. Accordingly, minority-targeted aid is not based on the faulty assumption that
a member of a particular race or ethnicity will automatically diversify an institution.
Rather, minority-targeted aid programs simply ensure that sufficient aid has been
reserved for those minority students who have already been admitted and who are more
likely to require additional aid in order to matriculate.
Moreover, individualized review is still possible when distributing minority-targeted
aid, even in race-exclusive scholarships. Minority-targeted aid is used to ensure that a
candidate will enroll. If minority-targeted aid is given to an applicant who would enroll
without it, use of the aid as an enrollment-management tool is no longer valid.
Accordingly, for each admitted minority student, institutions must consider whether
additional aid is necessary to ensure the student's enrollment. Institutions must also
consider the desirability of each admitted minority student, a decision that will
inevitably be determined by several factors, including standardized test scores, high
school grade point average, and special talents or skills; in such a determination, race is
not the determinative factor, but rather just one of many factors.
Race-exclusive funding does not mean that every minority candidate is guaranteed
additional aid, but rather that the funds have been reserved for a particular enrollment-
management purpose-in this case increasing diversity. If, based on an individual
review of an admitted student's financial status and admissions profile, an institution
decides that a highly desirable, diverse candidate is unlikely to attend without
additional aid, minority-targeted funds can be used. In this way, race is not necessarily
276. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
277. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38.
278. Id. at 337 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003)) (referring to the
admissions policy in Gratz, characterized as making race decisive for "virtually every minimally
qualified underrepresented minority applicant").
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outcome determinative for minority candidates, 279 even in those scholarships for which
race is an eligibility criterion.
ii. Flexibility
In the Michigan cases, the question of flexibility was heavily linked to the question
of individualized review and centered largely on whether an admissions program made
race or ethnicity the defining feature of an application. Such an admissions process
would run counter to the individualized, holistic review that contemplates all the
pertinent ways, other than race or ethnicity, in which a student might contribute to
diversity at an institution. 280 As discussed earlier, assessments of diversity are not
relevant to the distribution of minority-targeted aid as an enrollment tool, and
individualized review is still possible for minorities who receive minority-targeted aid
through race-exclusive grants or scholarships.
The Court's earlier remedial cases have also considered a program flexible if the
race-conscious conditions of a program can be waived when necessary.28 1 Even under
such a standard, minority-targeted aid is flexible. In using minority-targeted aid as an
enrollment-management tool, an institution is free to distribute awards based on the
desirability of the admitted student and on the particular financial need of that student.
After awards have been made to those minority candidates an institution wishes to
enroll, any remaining funds can be used for other aid purposes, including awards to
nonminority candidates. Moreover, if an institution decides that additional aid is not
necessary for its minority candidates to ensure enrollment, minority-targeted aid need
not be awarded at all.
iii. Quotas/Separate Tracks
The clearest principle to emerge from the Court's three cases addressing diversity in
higher education is that quotas in the admissions process are virtually impermissible
and will usually fail any narrow-tailoring test. In striking down the admissions policy at
issue in Bakke, which reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in each entering class
for disadvantaged minorities, Justice Powell noted that nonminority students were
excluded from competing for a specific percentage of seats in the entering class,
282
thereby insulating minority students from competition.28 3 The Grutter Court affirmed
Powell's assessment, stating that to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program can neither use a quota system that would insulate a "category of applicants
279. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (striking down the admissions policy because the automatic
assignment of twenty points to each minority candidate made race a determinative factor in the
admissions process by guaranteeing admission to almost every minimally qualified minority).
280. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
281. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). In Paradise, the Court reviewed a
promotion policy meant to address past discrimination against Blacks in the Alabama
Department of Public Safety and deemed the program flexible because the policy could be
waived if no qualified black candidates were available and only applied when the Department
needed to, and could afford to, make promotions. Id. at 177-78.
282. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978).
283. Seeid. at317.
[Vol. 85:851
DOG WAGS TAIL
with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants," nor
place applicant groups on separate admissions tracks.2 4
Critics will inevitably liken minority-targeted aid, and race-exclusive aid in
particular, to the quotas that were deemed impermissible in Bakke and Grutter.
According to this critique, limiting scholarship funds to all but a certain subset of
students, defined by race or ethnicity, reserves a fixed number or proportion of
opportunities exclusively for those students. Like the quotas in Bakke, this insulates
minority students from competition with other nonminority students for the aid.
In considering the validity of these critiques, context matters and requires a more
nuanced understanding of the way in which race-exclusive aid operates. Concern over
quotas in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz was underscored by the question of which
applicants deserved to receive an offer of admission and which factors an institution
could consider in making that determination. That determination was particularly
important, as an offer of admission to one student meant that another student would be
denied admission, and there were no alternate sources for an offer of admission to a
particular institution. As such, the use of quotas in the admissions context was
problematically outcome determinative. A financial-aid award to one student, however,
does not necessarily mean that another student cannot also obtain a financial-aid award,
either from the same or a different funding source. Moreover, determinations regarding
minority-targeted aid are less about which students deserve an award and more about
the desire of an institution to secure enrollment of a particular student. Institutions
regularly express these desires through the use of differential packaging to all students;
the fact that the aid comes from minority-targeted funding is an incidental
administrative function, the significance of which has no bearing on an institution's
right to manage its enrollments. Therefore, the need to avoid quotas that reserve
opportunities exclusively for one group is not as necessary in the case of minority-
targeted aid as it is in the case of race-conscious admissions.
Finally, race-exclusive aid can be likened to the "critical mass" or "attention to
numbers" that was sanctioned in Bakke and Grutter. Both cases recognized that some
attention to numbers is necessary if institutions are to admit diverse students in
numbers sufficient to reap the benefits of diversity. Justice Powell noted in Bakke that
including more than a token number of diverse students requires an institution to pay
attention to the distribution of students admitted among types and categories. 285 In
Grutter, the Court supported the law school's goal of achieving a "critical mass" of
underrepresented minority students because there is a relationship between numbers
and the benefits of diversity; the fact that an institution pays attention to numbers does
not transform the admissions process into a rigid quota.286 Just as critical-mass goals
represent the range in number of minority students an institution believes it must admit
to reap the benefits of diversity, resources for race-exclusive aid represent the amount
of funding an institution believes it needs to secure enrollment of those minorities. Just
as critical mass eschews a fixed number or percentage that must be attained, the
amount of funding reserved for race-exclusive aid does not necessarily have to be
exhausted, nor must it remain the same from year to year. Like the admissions process,
284. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
285. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
286. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336.
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individual determinations of whether a minority will need additional aid to enroll can
be made until an institution is comfortable that it has made enrollment possible for its
most desirable minority candidates.
iv. Necessity of Relief and Race-Neutral Alternatives
Narrow tailoring "does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative. 2 87 Moreover, as articulated in Grutter, race-neutral alternatives must also
be examined in light of the efficacy of those alternatives288 and must serve the
compelling interest "about as well. 2 89 In upholding the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions program, the Court noted that several race-neutral alternatives
existed, including the use of a lottery system for admission offers or a decrease in
emphasis on standardized test scores and grades. 290 The former alternative, however,
would have caused a decrease in genuine diversity, as institutions would be unable to
make nuanced decisions about diversity that contemplate characteristics other than race
and ethnicity.29' The latter would have required the law school to compromise
academic quality, an option that would have "sacrifice[d] a vital component of [the law
school's] educational mission., 292 Because neither option served the law school's
compelling interest in diversity as well as its "race-as-a-plus factor" admissions
process, race-neutral alternatives were not required.293
Similarly, equally effective race-neutral alternatives to minority-targeted aid do not
seem to exist. As an enrollment-management tool, minority-targeted aid seeks to
address the heightened financial concerns of minority groups, while at the same time
providing a symbol of commitment to diversity that encourages minority candidates to
apply and enroll if admitted. Initiatives like academic programming addressing race
and ethnicity, race- and ethnicity-themed housing, or retention programs may
communicate commitment to diversity as effectively as aid. But what is the alternative
to the provision of aid for students with heightened financial concerns? If an institution
seeks to be responsive to the heightened financial sensitivity of a particular race or
ethnic group, there is no alternative to reserving additional aid for that group. Minority-
targeted aid is a direct and efficient tool that allows an institution to respond to the
needs of groups it wants to enroll.
In addition, race-exclusive aid may be the only option for an institution with limited
aid resources and low levels of diversity on campus. In such a situation, race-exclusive
aid is perhaps the most efficient way of addressing a lack of diversity with limited
resources. In fact, this is the type of situation contemplated by Principle 4 of the
Department of Education guidelines on minority-targeted aid.294 Noting that even an
institution that is able to offer admission to a diverse group of applicants may
287. Id. at 339.
288. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
289. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 n.6
(1986)).
290. Id. at 340.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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nevertheless find their offers disproportionately rejected by minority applicants absent
aid, the Department conceded that such circumstances may warrant the use of race-
exclusive aid.295 Although race-exclusive aid at an institution with limited aid may
increase the burden for nonminorities, few alternatives exist if additional aid is
genuinely needed to encourage minorities to enroll.
Critics may be quick to insist that financial aid be strictly limited to need, rather
than race or ethnicity. Myriad social and economic factors, however, affect minority
need in a manner that is not readily captured by FAFSA forms and current financial-aid
formulas. FAFSA forms, for instance, do not consider home equity for purposes of
needs analysis.296 This exemption makes it more likely that FAFSA forms will indicate
equal need for many black and white students, even though black students are more
likely to hail from families with tenuous long-term financial security and lower levels
of home equity.297 Finally, race-neutral alternatives should be as effective as race-
targeted options.298 Research has suggested that initiatives that focus on economic
status alone do an inferior job of helping minority groups, often providing substantial
benefits to low-income Whites instead. 299 Accordingly, distributing financial aid to
minorities solely on the basis of income is not warranted by the current constitutional
standards because it would not be as effective.
295. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8757 (Feb. 23, 1994).
296. McPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 172, at 35.
297. See Malamud, supra note 192, at 984.
298. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (stating that race-neutral
alternatives should serve the interest "'about as well"') (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Judicial
Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 559,
578-79 (1975)); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
299. See Elena M. Bemal, Alberto F. Cabrer & Patrick T. Terenzini, The Relationship
Between Race and Socioeconomic Stress (SES): Implications for Institutional Research and
Admissions Policies, REMOVING VESTIGES, Dec. 2007, at 6 (concluding that low socioeconomic
Whites would disproportionately benefit from a class-based affirmative action admission
program, as compared to low socioeconomic status minority peers); Susan Leigh Flinspach &
Karen E. Banks, Moving Beyond Race: Socioeconomic Diversity as a Race-Neutral Approach
to Desegration in the Wake County Schools, in School RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN
BACK? 261, 270-76 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (finding that integration
plans that consider only socioeconomic status produce mixed to little success in reducing racial
isolation for minority students, even as they have provided access to middle-class schools for
white students); Sean F. Reardon, John T. Yun & Michal Kurlaender, Implications of Income-
Based School Assignment Policies for Racial School Segregation, 28 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL'Y ANALYSIS 49 (2006) (concluding that given residential segregation patterns, it is unlikely
that race-neutral income-integration policies will significantly reduce racial segregation). But
see John W. Young & Paul M. Johnson, The Impact of an SES-Based Model on a College's
Undergraduate Admissions Outcomes, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 777 (2004) (concluding that
for particular application populations, SES-based admissions policies might still maintain
diversity).
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v. Undue Burden
In cases addressing both remedial race-conscious programs and diversity in higher
education, the Court has emphasized that although some race-conscious policies or
programs may legitimately impose a burden on some, that burden must nevertheless be
balanced by the protection of individual rights. 300 The Court elaborated on that burden
in the Grutter opinion, concluding that under narrow tailoring standards, a race-
conscious admissions program may not "unduly harm members of any racial group.
' 30
'
The law school's admissions process, however, did not impose undue burden on
nonninority applicants because the individualized inquiry ensured that a rejected
applicant was not foreclosed from consideration merely because he or she was from a
nonpreferred race or ethnic group.
30 2
Based on the analysis in Grutter, it may initially seem that race-exclusive aid
similarly forecloses all nonminority applicants from consideration for an award from
minority-targeted funding. Comparisons of the burdens associated with admissions and
aid, however, warrant a different conclusion. The interest at stake in Grutter was an
offer of admission. The burden of being denied an offer on account of race meant that a
student could not attend the institution of his or her choice; in the admissions process,
for every student that is accepted, another student must be denied. In contrast, the
award of financial aid to one student from one source does not necessarily deny
another student financial aid from an alternate source, thus imposing a more diffuse
burden. This is particularly true considering the amount of minority-targeted aid which
is distributed every year. In the 1991-1992 school year, race-conscious aid made up no
more than 5% of all undergraduate and graduate scholarships and scholarship
dollars.30 3 Scholarships for which race or ethnicity were the sole criterion, represented
less than 1% of all undergraduate and graduate scholarships in the same year.
Furthermore, Whites are considerably more likely to receive merit aid than Blacks,
Latinos, and Asians, 30 5 particularly at private institutions where white students have
historically received amounts of aid that are not in proportion with their
representation. 30 6 In addition, because merit aid is often awarded on the basis of
academic records and standardized test scores, both of which are correlated with
300. Id. at 280-81 (recognizing that "[a]s part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating
racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the
remedy"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (qualifying Justice
Powell's assertion that colleges and universities have wide discretion to make admission
decisions by adding that constitutional limitations protecting the rights of individuals could not
be disregarded in exercise of that discretion).
301. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
302. Id.
303. U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITY-
TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS 4 (1994).
304. Id. at 6.
305. MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 172, at 122.
306. Id. at 126 (noting that Whites receive 86.4% of merit aid, even though they make up
only 82.9% of students).
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socioeconomic status, black and Latino students have been less likely than Whites to
be eligible for state merit programs. °7
Accordingly, the denial of aid from a minority-targeted- or race-exclusive-aid fund
does not intrusively deny nonminority students all aid; it merely forecloses one of a
multitude of aid sources for the sake of reserving enough funds to enable institutions to
manage minority enrollment.30 8 In light of the increased likelihood that a nonminority
student will receive merit aid (when compared to a minority student), and in light of the
small percentage of financial aid constituted by minority-targeted aid, the burden on
nonminorities, if any, is minimal and certainly worth the benefit. At the very least, if
the pursuit of a critical mass of minority students is constitutional, despite the burdens
created, then there is no undue burden in extending minority-targeted aid to ensure
enrollment of the students.
vi. Duration
The Supreme Court has not issued any concrete guidance regarding the permissible
duration of race-conscious programs employed at institutions of higher education
seeking diverse student bodies. Although acknowledging its prior assertions in earlier
remedial cases that race-conscious programs must have a termination point,309 the
Court in Grutter nevertheless extended to the University of Michigan extraordinary
deference in deciding when its race-conscious admissions policies should be
terminated.310 Accordingly, the Court "t[ook] the Law School at its word that it would
'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and [would]
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable."3 1' This leap
of faith regarding educational institutions was grounded in Justice Powell's assertion
twenty-five years earlier that the Court would "presume good faith on the part of
university officials in the absence of any showing to the contrary."
312
In distributing minority-targeted aid, institutions pursue the legitimate goal of
diversity with little or no burden to nonminorities. In the absence of any showing of
"bad faith," the same deference extended to institutions regarding the termination of
307. THE CIviL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THENEGATIVE
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS 76 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Matin eds.,
2002).
308. Although addressing a remedial case in UnitedStates v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987),
the Court made a similar determination regarding burden, concluding that a race-conscious
promotional policy imposed only a diffuse burden because it foreclosed only one of several
promotion opportunities, instead of creating job loss all together. Id. at 183.
309. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) ("[D]eviation from the norm of equal
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of
the goal of equality itself."). Earlier remedial cases include City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469,498 (1989) (striking down a race-conscious contracting policy, in part, because it
had no logical stopping point), and Wygant v. Jackson Board Of Education, 476 U.S. 267,275
(1986) (striking down a race-conscious hiring and promotion plan, in part, because the plan had
"no logical stopping point" and allowed a state entity to "engage in discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose").
310. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978)).
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admissions policies should be extended to institutions regarding the termination of
minority-targeted aid. Like decisions about admissions, institutions are capable of
deciding when consistent achievement of diversity goals warrants the termination of
minority-targeted aid or when the use of race-neutral alternatives are likely to be just as
effective.
CONCLUSION
The future of affirmative action programs in higher education is uncertain. The
majority that upheld race-conscious admissions in 2003 is no longer intact; recent
changes to the Court's composition have taken the Court in a decidedly more
conservative direction when addressing race-based policies and programs.
Furthermore, the narrow approach to Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court undermines the future of race-conscious programs and policies.
Recognition that universities may compensate for de facto discrimination caused by
standardized tests would strengthen the case for all programs that give a preference
based on race partly in response to de facto or societal discrimination, as would the
application of intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to race-conscious
programs designed to increase minority access to higher education. Unfortunately, the
Court has neither recognized remediation of de facto discrimination as a compelling
interest that satisfies strict scrutiny, nor approved intermediate scrutiny for benign race-
conscious policies.
Despite these uncertainties and existing scholarship to the contrary, 313 both race-
conscious and race-exclusive financial-aid programs are constitutional. Under
Grutter's strict-scrutiny analysis, which recognized diversity as a compelling interest in
admissions, minority-targeted aid is constitutional when properly contextualized as an
enrollment-management tool effectuating admissions decisions. Both race-conscious
and race-exclusive aid legitimately pursue a critical mass of minority students, while
providing individualized review to each candidate and placing no undue burden on
nonminority candidates.314
Minority-targeted aid exists to give effect to Grutter-sanctioned admissions
decisions--"dog wags tail." As scholars and practitioners prepare for the inevitable
challenge to minority-targeted aid that will surely reach the Supreme Court, a more
nuanced understanding of minority-targeted aid, and the purpose it serves, will help
ensure continued access to higher education for people of color.
313. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
314. Arguably, if an institution can administer race-conscious aid without forfeiting aid
donated with restrictions, and still enroll the same number of minority students, then race-
exclusive aid is probably not necessary. This proposition, however, is unrealistic for many
institutions, as illustrated by those institutions that refuse to abandon minority-targeted aid, even
in the face of potential legal action, as well as those institutions that only begrudgingly
dismantle minority-targeted aid programs to avoid legal action while acknowledging the
detrimental impact it will have on minority enrollment.
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